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Evaluating the Targeting Effectiveness of Social Transfers:  
A Literature Review 
 
Stephen Devereux, Edoardo Masset, Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, Michael Samson, 
Althea-Maria Rivas and Dolf te Lintelo 
 
Summary 
Many methodologies exist for dividing a population into those who are classified as eligible 
for social transfers and those who are ineligible. Popular targeting mechanisms include 
means testing, proxy means tests, categorical, geographic, community-based, and self-
selection. This paper reviews empirical evidence from a range of social protection 
programmes on the accuracy of these mechanisms, in terms of minimising four targeting 
errors: inclusion and exclusion, by eligibility and by poverty. This paper also reviews 
available evidence on the various costs associated with targeting, not only administrative but 
also private, social, psycho-social, incentive-based and political costs. Comparisons are 
difficult, but all mechanisms generate targeting errors and costs. Given the inevitability of 
trade-offs, there is no ‘best’ mechanism for targeting social transfers. The key determinant of 
relative accuracy and cost-effectiveness in each case is how well the targeting mechanism is 
designed and implemented. 
 
Keywords: targeting mechanisms; inclusion and exclusion errors; targeting costs 
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1 Introduction 
Targeting can be defined as any mechanism for identifying eligible individuals and screening 
out the ineligible from a population, for purposes of transferring resources such as social 
grants or preferential access to social services. 
 
This section discusses the rationale for targeting, explains the purpose of this literature 
review, introduces key concepts (e.g. ‘targeting errors’ and ‘social transfers’), presents 
alternative typologies of targeting mechanisms, and outlines the structure of this report. 
1.1 Rationale for targeting 
Why target a social transfer programme? The decision is motivated by ethical notions of 
fairness, as well as by pragmatic considerations such as cost-effectiveness. Societies that 
judge existing levels of poverty and inequality as unacceptable often introduce transfers to 
the poor as one solution to this inequity. But governments also aim to maximise welfare 
under budget constraints, to use available public resources cost-effectively. Both 
considerations inform targeting efforts, with the balance varying from case to case. 
 
Most social transfers aim to reduce poverty, so the obvious motivation is to provide support 
to people living in poverty. But this raises a series of questions. How to define poverty? Who 
are ‘the poor’? How to identify people living in poverty? A more pragmatic reason for 
targeting is to contain the cost of social transfer provision within specific budget limits. This 
raises a different set of questions. Can all people in need be reached with a limited budget? 
Is it better to reach all poor people with a small social transfer, or to target the ‘poorest of the 
poor’ with larger transfers? If a quota must be applied, how to do this and how to explain it to 
those poor people who are excluded? These are some of the conceptual and practical 
challenges that designers of social transfer programmes must address. 
 
Even if social transfers are explicitly intended to alleviate poverty, they are not always 
targeted directly at ‘the poor’. Social transfers are also given to older persons, orphans or 
people with disabilities, either because these ‘vulnerable groups’ are assumed to be 
deserving of support or because empirical data exists indicating that they are – on average – 
poorer than others and need financial assistance. So these characteristics are used as 
proxies or indicators of poverty. What does this mean for assessing the accuracy and 
effectiveness of targeted social transfers? One implication is that the coverage of such 
programmes can be assessed in two ways: 
 
1. In terms of their eligibility criteria (is everyone who receives a social pension over 60 
years old? Is everyone over 60 receiving a social pension?) 
2. In terms of the accuracy of the eligibility criteria as proxies for reaching poor people 
(what proportion of people over 60 years old are actually poor? What should be done to 
assist poor people under 60?) 
 
It is not always clear which definition of targeting accuracy should be used – eligibility or 
poverty – and in fact both indicators are of interest. On the one hand, it is important to know 
how well a programme is performing in terms of its specific eligibility criteria. On the other 
hand, it is also important to know whether a social transfer is reaching people most in need. 
This also allows targeting outcomes to be compared across programmes using a common 
benchmark – people assisted who are poor. This paper reports on either indicator, or both, 
depending on which is reported in programme evaluations or targeting assessments.  
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Even when social transfers are intended to reduce poverty, it is important to be realistic 
about what such programmes can achieve. Few social transfers are generous enough to lift 
people above the poverty line – often they raise recipients from ‘extreme poverty’ to 
‘moderate poverty’ – so despite their rapidly growing popularity in recent years, they are not 
a solution to poverty eradication on their own. A comprehensive anti-poverty strategy needs 
a mix of targeted, inclusive and enabling actions.  
 
Another powerful reason for targeting is pragmatic. Making the most efficient use of scarce 
public resources requires directing those resources to where they will have maximum impact. 
Given that all governments and development partners operate within constrained budgets, 
the biggest impact on poverty will be achieved by transferring resources directly to the poor. 
This might seem to be an argument against universal or untargeted programmes, which can 
be justified on other grounds (e.g. social inclusion) but are less efficient in reducing poverty, 
unless the costs of targeting are prohibitively high. But much depends on the scale of 
poverty. If 80% of a population are poor and it would cost more than 20% of a programme’s 
budget to identify and exclude the non-poor, universal coverage would actually be more 
efficient than a targeted programme. Alternatively, if universal programmes are seen as 
‘unaffordable’ but poverty is widespread, one option is to direct social transfers to the poorest 
of the poor (e.g. the poorest 10 or 20 percent), and to rely on other anti-poverty interventions 
(in agriculture, education, nutrition, health, etc) to complement social transfers and promote 
poverty reduction through sustainable growth in incomes. 
 
If the policy objective is to maximise poverty reduction in a context where public resources 
are constrained, the policy-maker’s problem is to find the optimum balance between 
effectiveness (reaching the intended individuals or households) and efficiency (doing so at 
reasonable cost). Because targeting is expensive, the most accurate mechanism (e.g. 
means testing every applicant) might be less cost-effective than a cheaper but less accurate 
mechanism (e.g. targeting a categorical ‘vulnerable group’, like all people with disabilities). 
This trade-off between targeting accuracy and targeting costs is one reason why there is no 
perfect targeting mechanism. 
 
Finally, it is important not to overlook the politics of targeting (Sen 1995). Selecting one group 
of the population to receive public support and excluding others from benefiting is a political 
act, even if it is justified on ‘technical’ grounds such as the government’s commitment to 
poverty reduction. For one thing, the middle-class, whose taxes contribute to financing 
poverty-targeted social transfers, need to give their political support for a programme that will 
not benefit them directly – this is one reason why governments sometimes opt for untargeted 
programmes, like universal free primary education. Politicians are striving to secure or 
sustain support, so their decisions about social transfer programmes might be overtly 
politicised (e.g. if they target social transfers to particular constituencies), or might be 
intended to address sources of social and political tension (e.g. unemployed youth, or 
historically neglected regions). While the overlap between political marginalisation, social 
exclusion and poverty is usually strong, it is never a 100% correlation. 
 
Summing up, social transfer programmes are targeted for various reasons: to maximise their 
poverty reducing impact, to make most efficient use of constrained public resources, and 
also for political objectives: to attract or retain support of key constituencies. However, as 
noted above, there are often trade-offs between these objectives. Also, as will be seen 
below, targeting is associated with a range of errors, costs and negative consequences, 
which have led some to propose universal transfers rather than poverty targeted social 
transfers (van de Walle 1998; Mkandawire 2005). 
 
This raises a related point – though this report does not discuss ‘universal’ programmes 
(such as a Basic Income Grant, fee-free education or a National Health Service free at the 
point of delivery), the line between untargeted and targeted programmes is sometimes more 
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fuzzy than it appears. For instance, a social pension where eligibility is restricted only by age 
might be considered ‘universal’ in the sense that it reaches all older citizens, but only weakly 
‘targeted’ at poor citizens because it excludes all the non-elderly poor. 
1.2 Rationale for this review 
Targeting is one of the most challenging and controversial aspects of the design and 
implementation of social transfer programmes throughout the world – challenging because it 
is almost impossible to target with 100% accuracy, and controversial because decisions 
about whether, how and who to target invariably raise strong feelings and heated debate. 
 
This review aims to summarise knowledge from a selected subset of the literature on the 
errors, costs and secondary consequences (both positive and negative) of targeting in actual 
social transfer programmes in developing countries, in a comparative way across different 
types of programmes and different targeting mechanisms. Although other reviews of 
experiences with targeting exist, no comprehensive assessment has been undertaken since 
Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004), which covered 122 social transfer programmes 
implemented during the period 1985-2000. Yet the past decade has seen a proliferation of 
social transfer programmes under the rapidly evolving social protection agenda, and a 
corresponding increase in the number of rigorous evaluations of the design and impact of 
these programmes. Without claiming to be comprehensive or exhaustive, this report offers an 
updated synthesis of selected thinking and evidence on targeting, and should provide a 
useful reference point for informing the future selection, design and implementation of 
targeting mechanisms for social transfer programmes. 
1.3 The targeting process 
Selecting an appropriate targeting mechanism for a social transfer programme requires 
taking a series of decisions, from choosing eligibility criteria to monitoring programme 
outcomes. Specifically, targeting social transfers involves the following series of steps. 
 
1. What is the aim of the social transfer programme? 
(e.g. to promote livelihoods and poverty reduction, to provide protection against 
livelihood shocks, or to provide support to a particularly vulnerable group) 
2. What is the aim of the targeting process? 
(e.g. to reach the poor (poverty targeting), or to direct benefits for other reasons, for 
example, an old age entitlement) 
3. Who decides on eligibility criteria? 
(e.g. programme administrators, politicians, communities) 
4. What are the eligibility criteria? 
(e.g. poverty, age, disability, unemployment, citizenship) 
5. When does identification of beneficiaries occur? 
(before delivery of social transfers, or on collection of social transfers) 
6. Who identifies programme beneficiaries? 
(e.g. technocrats, communities, or beneficiaries themselves) 
7. What information is available to facilitate the targeting process? 
(at what frequency and level of disaggregation, with what quality, at what cost?) 
8. Are social transfers actually delivered to people identified as eligible – and to 
people who are actually poor? 
(how large are the inclusion errors? how large are the exclusion errors?) 
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9. What are the financial costs of the targeting process? 
(how much programme budget was spent on identifying beneficiaries?) 
10. What are the secondary consequences of the targeting process? 
(e.g. did the exclusion of community members cause any social tensions?) 
 
The first seven of these ten steps relate to how targeting is done; the final three steps relate 
to how targeting is assessed. Targeting mechanisms can be classified in terms of decisions 
taken under steps 1-7 above. For instance, if communities select beneficiaries this is a 
community-based targeting mechanism, while if beneficiaries identify themselves this is a 
self-targeting approach. For purposes of learning and retargeting (because people’s 
circumstances change), regular reassessment of beneficiaries is often needed in long-
running programmes. Implementation decisions and assessment should both be part of an 
integrated targeting process. 
 
The expectation informing the selection of a targeting mechanism is that decisions taken 
under steps 1-7 will produce good targeting outcomes in terms of steps 8-10: reasonably 
accurate, acceptable cost, with few negative secondary consequences. From a programming 
perspective, these outcomes are sometimes defined by predetermined parameters; e.g. 
inclusion error should not exceed xx%, targeting costs should not absorb more than xx% of 
programme budget. From a research perspective, our interest is in comparing outcomes 
across alternative targeting mechanisms. Our hypothesis is that different targeting 
mechanisms are associated with systematic differences in terms of inclusion and exclusion 
errors, financial costs and secondary consequences. The focus of this evidence-based 
review is therefore on steps 8–10 of the targeting process. 
1.4 Targeting mechanisms 
Any approach to targeting is based on a set of criteria that screens the eligible from the 
overall population. These criteria for screening applicants, and who applies the criteria, 
constitute different targeting mechanisms. The most common mechanisms include: means 
tests, proxy means tests, categorical targeting, geographic targeting, community-based 
targeting, and self-targeting. Box 1.1 presents three alternative classification systems. Social 
transfer programmes often use combinations of targeting mechanisms, either 
simultaneously, sequentially, or in parallel. 
 
Box 1.1 Classifying targeting mechanisms 
Slater and Farrington (2009) identify ‘three main targeting approaches – poverty, social 
categorical and geographical; and … a number of targeting mechanisms – community-
based, proxy indicators, means-testing, self-targeting and geographical … Targeting 
approaches associated with poverty generally focus on households, and use criteria of 
(low) income, expenditure, consumption and assets; whilst social categorical targeting 
focuses on whether individuals belong to a specific social or demographic group (older 
people, disabled people, women, children, disadvantaged tribal or ethnic groups, etc). 
Typically, poverty targeting involves criteria that are continuous variables whilst social 
categorical involves more easily observable dichotomous indicators (i.e. people are either 
part of a social category – young, old, male, female, etc – or they are not). Geographical 
targeting selects different districts or villages or regions – often on the basis of poverty 
data where poverty is known to be chronic, or on the basis of other criteria (such as 
proneness to earthquakes, flooding etc where natural disasters are common and poverty 
may be more transitory’ 
(Slater and Farrington 2009: 6) 
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The Economic Policy Research Institute (2006) describes four approaches to targeting. 
‘Individual or household assessments involve evaluating incomes, expenditures, 
assets or personal characteristics. Categorical targeting involves identifying easily 
distinguishable attributes that characterise poor households and the provision of benefits 
to those who share those traits – such as children, older people or people who live in low-
income areas. Some programmes attempt to target the poor by making the resource 
provided relatively unattractive – so that only the poorest will want it ... (self-targeting) ... 
Community targeting can involve any of these other mechanisms, but the 
determinations are made at a community level.’ 
(Samson, van Niekerk and MacQuene 2006: 55) 
‘According to Coady et al. (2004), the 6 main targeting methods used to identify eligible 
recipients for transfers include 1) Means testing, based on income, 2) Proxy means 
testing, based on some indicator of poverty, 3) Community-based targeting, based on 
local knowledge of poverty, 4) Geographical targeting based on location, 5) Demographic 
targeting, based on some characteristic such as age, gender, or orphanhood, and 6) Self-
targeting, which is available to all who apply’ 
(Miller, Tsoka and Reichert 2010: 4) 
 
This report classifies and analyses targeting mechanisms under six ‘pure’ categories and one 
‘hybrid’ category: 
 
1. Means testing: based on an assessment of income, assets or wealth of applicants 
(including unverified means-testing) 
2. Proxy means testing: based on a weighted combination of characteristics that are 
believed to be highly correlated with wellbeing or deprivation 
3. Categorical targeting: based on characteristics of interest to policy-makers, which 
might or might not be correlated with wellbeing or deprivation  
4. Geographic targeting: based on location or residence (e.g. an area affected by a 
hazard, or a district with high poverty prevalence] 
5. Community-based targeting: based on an eligibility assessment performed by the 
community where a programme is implemented 
6. Self-targeting: based on voluntary participation or self-selection. 
7. Multiple mechanisms: where more than one mechanism is used to identify programme 
participants, either simultaneously, sequential or in parallel. 
 
In practice, many social transfer programmes (or most programmes, since geographical 
boundaries and citizenship invariably constitute first-level eligibility criteria) actually use a 
combination of targeting mechanisms, to refine targeting accuracy. For example, categorical 
programmes can either be ‘universal’ (all people over 60) or ‘poverty targeted’ (poor people 
over 60, combining categorical targeting and means testing). ‘Multiple’ targeting mechanisms 
are analysed as a separate category in this report. 
1.5 Structure of this report 
This report is structured around a review of empirical evidence from the literature on three 
key aspects of targeting – errors, costs, and cost-effectiveness. Section 2 describes the 
methodology we used to select documents for inclusion in this review. Section 3 focuses on 
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targeting errors, and summarises recently available evidence by targeting mechanism on 
inclusion and exclusion errors of social transfer programmes, by design and implementation, 
and/or according to programme eligibility criteria and poverty. Section 4 focuses on targeting 
costs, broadly defined to include administrative, private, social, psycho-social, political and 
incentive-based costs. Section 5 extends this analysis to consider the (limited) evidence on 
cost-effectiveness of targeting. Section 6 discusses the implications of our findings on 
targeting errors, costs and cost-effectiveness, for policy and practice. Finally, an Appendix 
provides a table of inclusion and exclusion errors reported on programmes discussed in this 
report, categorised by targeting mechanism. 
 
2 Methodology 
Any literature review has to set its parameters. This review of literature on targeting social 
transfers was initially commissioned as a ‘systematic review’, which meant that a rigorous 
selection process had to be followed that necessarily excluded large numbers of publications 
that did not meet the search criteria and filters. First we defined the review’s key search 
terms (‘social transfer programmes’, ‘targeting mechanisms’), its geographic boundaries 
(‘developing countries’) and its timeframe (from 2000 onwards). Publications that met these 
search criteria were selected for this review if they reported on key outcomes of interest 
(targeting errors, targeting costs, negative and positive social consequences). Most of these 
studies reported data from actual programmes, but some ex ante simulations of targeting 
methods and outcomes were also included. 
2.1 Social transfer programmes 
Social transfers can be defined as regular non-contributory payments, in cash or in kind (e.g. 
food or vouchers), made by government or non-government organisations (NGOs) to 
individuals or households, with the objective of decreasing chronic or shock-induced poverty, 
addressing social risk and/or reducing economic vulnerability (adapted from Samson et al. 
2006: 2). 
 
Social transfer programmes include non-contributory welfare grants (social pensions, 
disability grants, child support grants, family allowances), conditional transfers (such as 
conditional cash transfers where benefits are conditional on compliance with household 
participation in education and health services, or public works projects where benefits are 
conditional on work), and in-kind transfers (school feeding schemes, food stamps or 
commodity-denominated vouchers). Since our definition of social transfer programmes 
specifies ‘regular’ payments, short-term programmes or once-off transfers (for instance, 
emergency relief interventions) are excluded from consideration in this review. Other 
interventions that share some characteristics but do not qualify as social transfers include 
contributory social security, microfinance, and fee waivers (Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1 List of included and excluded social transfer programmes 
Included Excluded 
Regular non-contributory cash grants  
(or unconditional cash transfers): 
 Social pensions 
 Disability grants 
 Child benefit/ child support grant 
 Family allowances 
Regular conditional transfers 
 Conditional cash transfers 
 Public works programmes 
 Employment guarantee schemes 
 School feeding programmes 
Regular in-kind transfers 
 Food stamps 
 Food subsidies 
 Regular food distribution 
 Voucher schemes 
Contributory social security schemes 
Short-term or once-off social transfers (e.g. asset 
transfer programmes) 
Emergency relief interventions 
Microfinance programmes 
Social funds/ Social action funds 
Agricultural input subsidies 
Education or health fee waivers 
Public utility subsidies 
2.2 Targeting mechanisms 
Only targeting mechanisms used in actual social transfer programmes are included in this 
review. Several alternative classification systems are summarised in Box 1.1 above. For 
purposes of this review, six discrete targeting mechanisms were identified. Very often, 
targeted programmes use two or more mechanisms in combination, and this is recognised as 
a seventh category. 
 
1 Means testing 
2 Proxy means testing 
3 Categorically targeting 
4 Geographically targeting 
5 Community-based targeting 
6 Self-targeting 
7 Multiple mechanisms. 
2.3 Reported outcomes 
The review compiles evidence on four indicators of targeting errors, costs and positive and 
negative secondary consequences, which are analysed comparatively across the different 
targeting methodologies described above. Only studies that report on one or more of these 
four indicators are included in this review: 
 
1. Errors (inclusion and exclusion) in implementation 
2. Targeting costs 
3. Negative social consequences of targeting 
4. Positive outcomes across targeting mechanisms 
 
Targeting costs are expressed as a proportion of the programme budget. Normally only 
administrative costs are reported by the studies, which is a limitation. Where data are 
available, full targeting costs are assessed. These include: administrative costs, private costs 
(opportunity costs, travel costs), incentive-based costs (e.g. behavioural change to meet 
eligibility criteria), social costs (erosion of community cohesion), political costs (loss of 
political support) and psycho-social costs (stigma). 
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Secondary effects and other intangible costs are not often quantified. They can nevertheless 
be categorised, and in this report their observed prevalence is summarised and analysed 
comparatively across different targeting mechanisms. 
 
Note that we are not reviewing evaluations of the impact of social transfer programmes by 
targeting mechanism, because this confuses a design choice (targeting mechanism) with 
programme outcomes (impacts), which are determined by a broad range of design choices 
and implementation modalities. A programme’s relative performance against its objectives 
cannot be attributed to its choice of targeting mechanism. Instead, we assess the 
effectiveness of targeting mechanisms only in their own terms: Did they reach their intended 
beneficiaries? Were the beneficiaries poor? What were the costs of targeting? Was the 
targeting cost-effective? What were the secondary consequences of targeting? 
2.4 Year of publication 
Studies published or reporting on data collected before the year 2000 are excluded, for two 
reasons. First, the review of targeting by Coady et al. (2004) already covers studies 
published in the 1990s, and there is no value-added in replicating their analysis. Second, 
social transfer programmes have made considerable advances during the 2000s, partly by 
incorporating learning from the experiences of the 1990s, so a focus on more recent 
programming experience accurately captures the current state of targeting practice. 
2.5 Geographic coverage 
Only social transfer programmes implemented in developing countries were considered for 
this review. Our definition of ‘developing country’ extended to all countries that are not 
among the 66 countries defined as ‘high-income’ by the World Bank. Note that ‘upper-
middle-income’ countries like Brazil are included, on the grounds that a large proportion of 
the population in these countries live in conditions of extreme poverty. 
2.6 Search strategy 
A number of electronic databases were searched in conducting this review, covering 
published work, unpublished work and relevant institutional websites (Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2 List of databases searched 
Published work Unpublished work Institutions 
Agris 
Econolit 
IBSS 
JSTOR 
PubMed 
ASSA 
Web of Science 
BLDS/ELDIS/IDS 
Google Scholar 
IDEAS 
JOLIS 
International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3Ie) 
Asian Development Bank 
DFID 
IADB 
IFPRI 
World Bank e-library 
World Food Programme 
 
Search terms were divided into two tiers. Tier 1 contained 16 phrases that described types of 
social transfer programmes, and Tier 2 contained 14 targeting-related words and phrases, 
including alternative targeting mechanisms (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3. Database search terms 
Tier 1 Tier 2 
Social transfers 
Social grants 
Cash transfers 
In-kind transfers 
Non-contributory 
Conditional cash transfers 
Unconditional cash transfers 
Social pension 
Disability grant 
Child support grant 
Family allowance 
Public-works programmes 
Employment-guarantee schemes 
School feeding programmes 
Food stamps 
Voucher schemes 
Targeting 
Targeting errors 
Targeting costs 
Inclusion errors 
Exclusion errors 
Targeting efficiency 
Targeting effectiveness 
Categorical targeting 
Means test 
Proxy indicator 
Self-targeting 
Self-selection 
Community-based targeting 
Geographic targeting 
 
The first-stage screening generated 1,406 documents, which were inputted into EPPI 
Reviewer,1 then checked for duplicates and whether they met the selection criteria (in terms 
of geographical region, publication date, type of intervention, etc). This second-stage 
screening reduced the number of documents selected to 254, of which 140 were ‘sure’ (the 
document definitely met the selection criteria) and 114 were ‘unsure’ (the document needed 
further assessment). 
 
The third-stage screening involved a full text review of the 254 documents against the four 
outcome indicators identified above. The reviewers made an assessment of the relevance of 
the research against a checklist – whether the paper quantifies targeting errors, explores the 
social costs of targeting, or discusses the cost-effectiveness of targeting in a rigorous and 
credible way. A minimum set of quality requirements (for methodological rigour) was also 
established – for instance, data on targeting errors should be obtained from credible sources 
(preferably surveys representative of the beneficiary population, with samples of a sufficient 
size to allow statistically significant estimates to be derived), and data on targeting costs 
should be obtained from reliable sources (such as project documents and monitoring forms). 
This process reduced the total documents finally included in this report to 85 covering about 
30 programmes. 
 
Several of these documents review evidence from multiple countries, but the majority present 
empirical evidence from specific social transfer programmes. All 41 countries with 
programmes that are explicitly discussed in this report are listed in Table 2.4 below. As noted 
above, these programmes all fall into one of the following types: conditional cash transfers 
(7), unconditional cash transfers (15), child benefit (8), disability grants (2), social pensions 
(9), food subsidies (4), food distribution (4), public works programmes (4), and school feeding 
programmes(2). 
 
                                                 
1  The Evidence for Policy and Practice Information and Co-ordinating Centre (EPPI-Centre) is part of the Social Science 
Research Unit at the Institute of Education, University of London. EPPI Reviewer is a web application that enables 
researchers to upload documents for screening, keywording, data extraction and analysis (http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/). 
16 
 
Table 2.4. Countries represented in this review 
Africa Asia Europe/ Central Asia Latin America 
Botswana Bangladesh Albania Bolivia 
Egypt Brunei Azerbaijan Brazil 
Ethiopia Cambodia Bulgaria Colombia 
Ghana China Estonia Ecuador 
Kenya India Hungary Jamaica 
Malawi Indonesia Kyrgrz Republic Mexico 
Mauritius Mongolia Poland Nicaragua 
Namibia Nepal Russian Federation Peru 
Rwanda Philippines  Uruguay 
Somalia Samoa   
South Africa Vietnam   
Tanzania    
Zimbabwe    
 
3 Targeting errors 
This section first discusses definitions of targeting errors from the literature and proposes a 
broader approach, then reviews empirical evidence on targeting errors by targeting 
mechanism. 
3.1 Defining targeting errors 
According to the targeting literature, targeting generates two types of error: inclusion and 
exclusion (Cornia and Stewart 1993). Inclusion errors occur when programme benefits reach 
some unintended beneficiaries. Exclusion errors occur when programme benefits do not 
reach all of the intended beneficiaries. 
 
1. Inclusion error is the proportion of a programme’s beneficiaries who are technically 
ineligible. For our purposes, inclusion error is defined as the percentage of beneficiaries 
who receive social transfers, despite not meeting the eligibility criteria. 
2. Exclusion error is the proportion of eligible individuals or households that do not 
receive programme benefits. For our purposes, exclusion error is defined as the 
percentage of individuals or households that do not receive social transfers, despite 
meeting the eligibility criteria. 
 
Although these definitions are consistent with the literature, they reflect a narrow view of 
targeting, in two ways. Firstly, they describe targeting errors in implementation, meaning that 
the predefined rules for identifying and registering eligible beneficiaries are not fully met in 
practice (see Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1. Two errors of targeting in implementation 
 
Source: Hurrell (2009). Reproduced with kind permission of Oxford Policy Management. 
 
Secondly, if the objective of a social transfer programme is to reach poor people in order to 
reduce or alleviate their poverty, then the targeting strategy can generate targeting errors by 
design. Even if a programme reaches all its intended beneficiaries, and no-one else, 
inclusion or exclusion of poor people can occur, if there are ‘leakages’ to the non-poor (e.g. 
with a general food price subsidy) or ‘under-coverage’ of the poor because the targeting 
mechanism does not explicitly target the poor (e.g. a child benefit that fails to reach poor 
families without children). A case in point is universal pensions. If old age is taken as a proxy 
for poverty, then ‘inclusion error by design’ (leakage) refers to all people over 60 who receive 
a pension despite not being poor. Conversely, ‘exclusion error by design’ (under-coverage) 
refers to all people who are poor but do not receive a social pension because they are under 
60 years old. 
 
Implementation of targeting will typically result in both inclusion and exclusion errors. 
Inclusion errors in implementation increase programme costs by spending money on 
ineligible people, while exclusion errors in implementation deprive eligible individuals of 
resources that they might desperately need, to escape poverty or to avoid destitution or even 
death. Some analysts (notably Cornia and Stewart 1993) have suggested weighting 
exclusion errors several times higher than inclusion errors, on the grounds that the 
humanitarian costs of failing to assist people in need are worse than the financial costs of 
‘leaking’ some resources to people who don’t need assistance. 
 
In practice there is an inevitable trade-off between these two errors. Assume that the poverty 
headcount is 30%. If the budget allocated to social transfers can reach only 10% of the 
population, coverage is rationed and there will be under-coverage, or exclusion errors by 
design. As the budget increases towards 30% of the population, exclusion errors by design 
will fall towards zero, and if the budget allows for coverage of more than 30% of the 
population, inclusion errors by design (or over-coverage) will increase. Of course, even with 
coverage <30% there will be some inclusion errors, and with coverage >30% there will be 
some exclusion errors (except in untargeted programmes with universal access), to the 
extent that there is mis-targeting in implementation. 
 
The issue of targeting errors by design – specifically, targeting the poor versus reaching all 
the poor – is especially pertinent on small-scale pilot projects. Many social transfer pilot 
projects report low inclusion and exclusion errors in implementation, but since they are 
operational only in some parts of the country (e.g. one or two districts) they exclude the 
majority of poor people in the country by design. Similarly, even a robust proxy for poverty 
excludes all poor people who do not meet this criterion. (If everyone over 60 years old is poor 
then a perfectly delivered ‘universal’ social pension would have zero inclusion error by design 
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or exclusion error in implementation, but at national level exclusion error by design is high to 
the extent that there are poor citizens under 60 years of age.)  
 
On the other hand, it might be unreasonable to expect a single intervention to reach all the 
poor. At national level, coverage should be assessed over all relevant programmes. A social 
protection system that includes social pensions, child grants, disability grants and a demand-
led employment guarantee scheme will probably achieve a cumulative coverage of most 
poor citizens.  
 
This discussion raises five questions that must be resolved before we can assess the 
magnitude of different targeting errors on specific programmes. 
 
First, should targeting errors be measured in terms of eligibility criteria or poverty 
status? In cases where the poverty focus of categorical criteria or proxy means tests is 
assessed, exclusion error is defined as ‘the proportion of poor households that do not benefit 
from the programme’, while inclusion error is ‘the proportion of programme beneficiaries that 
are non-poor’ (Hodges et al. 2007: 13). But this implies that all targeting mechanisms should 
be assessed on their ability to reach the poorest members of the population. Some analysts 
hold this view – ‘Better targeting is not seen as desirable in its own right, but rather as an 
instrument for reducing poverty’ (Ravallion 2007: 2) – but others argue that targeting should 
be assessed only in terms of the programme’s eligibility criteria. For instance, for a ‘universal’ 
pension that targets all people over 60 years of age, inclusion error is all pension recipients 
under 60, not the percentage of recipients or people over 60 who are non-poor; and 
exclusion error is all non-recipients over 60, not the percentage of non-recipients or people 
under 60 who are poor. 
 
In this review, the authors adopt the position that the targeting accuracy of social transfer 
programmes should firstly be assessed in terms of whether it reaches the eligible groups.2 
Whether that group is a good proxy for poverty is a separate question which can in part be 
answered by the targeting analysis, however, the accuracy of targeting must in the first 
instance relate to the exact specification the programme intended to target, and secondly in 
terms of coverage of the poor. Although high inclusion errors (in terms of non-poor 
beneficiaries) are a concern with ‘universal’ targeting – for instance, if the objective of a 
social pension is to provide income security in old age, there is no reason to include older 
persons who are already income secure – high exclusion errors are inevitable, because no 
single instrument targeted at one category of beneficiaries can be expected to reach most 
poor people: a social protection system comprising several instruments is required. Only if a 
demographically targeted programme is also means tested – as with South Africa’s Disability 
Grant (Mitra 2010) – does the recipient’s poverty status also become directly relevant in 
assessing targeting accuracy. 
 
Second, should undercoverage in programme design be measured as a targeting 
error? For instance, if a social cash transfer programme targets poor rural households, 
should exclusion error be assessed as only poor rural households that do not receive 
transfers, or as all poor individuals in the country (including poor urban households) who do 
not receive transfers? High exclusion rates on social transfer programmes often reflect 
budgetary constraints, or a policy decision to concentrate resources in priority regions or on 
priority groups, and this is better understood as ‘undercoverage’ (i.e. planned exclusion by 
                                                 
2 According to Ravallion (2007: 7): “A Type 1 error can be defined as incorrectly classifying a person as poor, while a Type 2 
error is incorrectly classifying a person as not poor. A Type 1 error entails a leakage of transfers to the non-poor, while a 
Type 2 error implies lower coverage of the poor.” But this ignores the possibility that targeting is based on other criteria 
apart from poverty. Consider a country where every citizen over 60 has a legislated right to a social pension, even though 
no older person is living in poverty and some citizens under 60 are poor. If all older persons – and only older persons – 
receive the pension, staff would congratulate themselves on achieving 0% inclusion and 0% exclusion error, but Ravallion 
would assign this programme a 100% inclusion error and 100% exclusion error. 
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design) than ‘mistakes’ made during a beneficiary registration process (i.e. unplanned 
exclusion in implementation). A review of coverage of the poor by conditional cash transfer 
programmes found ‘significant variation … from about 1% of the poorest decile in Cambodia 
to more than 60% in Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico’ – which was explained by ‘the size and 
budget of the programs’ (Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 73). We therefore differentiate between 
‘exclusion by design’ (eligibility criteria that result in ‘undercoverage’ in terms of reaching all 
poor people) and ‘exclusion in implementation’ (failure to register and pay all individuals or 
households who meet the eligibility criteria) in reporting on targeting outcomes below. 
 
Third, if eligible individuals choose not to enrol, does this count as exclusion error? 
Exclusion errors can result from inadequate enrolment of eligible people, either because of 
inadequate outreach3 or because potential beneficiaries choose not to apply. In many 
(perhaps most) cases, some eligible households fail to enrol for the programme, although 
this is not often measured. (Burdin and de Melo (2009) provide a rare exception.) Failure to 
apply is not a targeting ‘error’ in terms of incorrect assessment, but it is an indicator of 
‘unplanned undercoverage’. In most cases, this should be counted as a form of exclusion 
error, because the reasons are often related to programme implementation: inadequate 
information or outreach, complex or costly enrolment procedures in terms of financial costs, 
information processing costs, waiting costs, social and psychological costs (Burdin and de 
Melo 2009: 144). 
 
Box 3.1. Exclusion error or failure to enrol? 
Coady and Parker (2009) model enrolment onto a programme in three stages: (1) know-
ledge; (2) application; (3) acceptance – the second being under the household’s control 
while only the first and third are under the administrator’s. Failure to apply is invariably 
related to either lack of knowledge or high costs of applying. In the case of South Africa’s 
Child Support Grant, coverage of eligible children increased from 9% to 58% between 
2000 and 2004 – so exclusion error fell from 91% to 42% in four years – mainly due to a 
government campaign to enrol eligible children, and the simplification of application 
procedures (Samson et al. 2006: 6-7). Nepal’s ‘universal’ Old Age Pension reaches only 
77% of the age-qualified population, because of ‘difficulties in establishing proof of age, 
delays in processing applications, difficulties in reaching remote areas of the country, and 
the fact that some of the wealthy do not bother to apply for a pension’ (Willmore 2007: 
30). Reasons for low take-up of Ecuador’s conditional cash transfer programme include 
stigma and high transaction costs relative to the benefits provided. For some residents of 
Amazonia (where poverty rates are high but enrolment is very low), enrolling for the 
conditional cash transfer would require walking for more than a day each way, or paying 
up to $50 for a motorboat ride or up to $480 for a return flight (Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 
79). 
 
Fourth, if eligibility numbers are not quantifiable, how should targeting errors be 
measured? In some programmes, targeting errors are difficult to quantify because eligibility 
criteria are vaguely specified (e.g. communities are asked to identify their ‘most vulnerable 
households’). In such cases, targeting errors can be approximated by assessing ‘benefit 
incidence’ – mapping beneficiaries against the population’s poverty profile. Many studies 
reviewed follow this procedure (e.g. Alderman 2001; Maluccio 2009). This introduces the 
challenge of comparing findings across studies where different poverty thresholds were 
assessed, or even defining targeting errors within the same programme, where ‘inclusion’ 
and ‘exclusion’ errors are reported for different thresholds (e.g. the poorest 20%, or the 
                                                 
3 Castaneda (2005: 11) differentiates between ‘outreach’ and ‘application’ approaches to registration, and explains the 
advantages and disadvantages of each. An ‘outreach’ approach requires extensive surveys to identify and register eligible 
beneficiaries, but an ‘application’ approach invites anyone who believes they are eligible to apply to be registered. 
‘Outreach’ methods are considered to be more comprehensive but also more expensive to implement. 
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poorest 40%). (Note that community-based targeting can generate targeting outcomes that 
are quantifiable. For instance, if communities are asked to identify all ‘female-headed 
households’ or ‘orphans’, inclusion and exclusion errors should be assessed in terms of 
these eligibility criteria.) 
 
Fifth, should a programme’s impact on poverty be considered as an indicator of 
targeting success? This review argues against this position. ‘A number of factors cloud the 
relationship between targeting performance and total impact on poverty, including aspects of 
program design, implementation and the context in which a program operates’ (Ravallion 
2007: 2-3). This review focuses on the accuracy and cost-effectiveness of mechanisms for 
identifying and reaching poor and/or eligible people (individuals or households) rather than 
the impact of social transfer programmes on poverty. Therefore, we do not consider the class 
of targeting measures that are based on benefit incidence, or the ‘concentration curve’: ‘the 
cumulative share of transfers going to the poorest p% of the population ranked by household 
income per person’ (Ravallion 2007: 5). Such measures include: (1) the share of transfers 
going to the poorest xx% of households; (2) the normalised share; and (3) the concentration 
index. Our analysis focuses on who benefits from social transfer programmes, not on the 
size of the benefits transferred. 
 
This analysis allows us to identify not two but four errors of targeting – inclusion (I) and 
exclusion (E) error both in terms of eligibility (E) and in terms of poverty (P). 
 
1. Inclusion error by eligibility (error in implementation) (IE) is the proportion of a 
programme’s beneficiaries who do not meet the eligibility criteria but do receive social 
transfers. 
2. Exclusion error by eligibility (error in implementation) (EE) is the proportion of eligible 
individuals or households in a programme area who do meet the eligibility criteria but do 
not receive social transfers. 
3. Inclusion error by poverty (error by design) (IP) is the proportion of a programme’s 
beneficiaries who meet the eligibility criteria and receive social transfers but are not 
poor. 
4. Exclusion error by poverty (error by design) (EP) is the proportion of individuals or 
households in a programme area who do not meet the eligibility criteria and do not 
receive social transfers but are poor. 
 
Four types of targeting error4 
Errors 
Eligibility Criteria 
(in implementation) 
Poverty 
(by design) 
Inclusion 
IE 
(Recipient, not eligible) 
IP 
(Recipient, not poor) 
Exclusion 
EE 
(Non-recipient, eligible) 
EP 
(Non-recipient, poor) 
 
To illustrate these four errors, consider the example we have discussed previously, of a 
universal social pension, where eligibility is open to all individuals 60 years of age and over. 
 
                                                 
4  We are indebted to Heather Kindness for proposing this diagrammatic formulation of the four types of error examined in 
this literature review. 
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1. Inclusion error by eligibility (IE) is all social pension recipients under 60. 
2. Exclusion error by eligibility (EE) is all individuals aged 60 and over who do not 
receive a social pension. 
3. Inclusion error by poverty (IP) is all social pension recipients who are not poor. 
4. Exclusion error by poverty (EP) is all individuals under 60 who are poor. 
 
Four targeting errors with social pensions for all individuals aged 60 and over 
Errors Eligibility Criteria Poverty 
Inclusion Recipients under 60 Non-poor recipients 
Exclusion 
Non-recipients aged 60 
and over 
Poor non-recipients 
 
3.2 Overview of evidence from international experience 
Coady et al. (2004) compared targeting outcomes on over 100 programmes, using a poverty-
based performance measure: ‘the percentage of benefits accruing to either the bottom 40 
percent or 20 percent of the national income distribution’. Based on this indicator, they 
reached the following key conclusions (Coady et al. (2004: 2-3). 
 
1. Targeting can work: On average, targeted programmes ‘provide approximately 25% 
more resources to the poor than would random allocations’. 
2. Targeting does not always work: About 25% of programmes were regressive – ‘a 
random allocation of resources would have provided a greater share of benefits to the 
poor’. 
3. No single targeting mechanism works best in all contexts: ‘80 percent of the variability in 
targeting performance was due to differences within targeting methods and only 20 
percent was due to differences across methods’. 
4. Targeting mechanisms can be ranked by performance: (1) Transfers accruing to the 
poor increase most from self-targeting on public works (by 40%), followed by geographic 
targeting (34%), and means testing (30%). (2) Proxy means tests achieve a smaller pro-
poor benefit (8%) and along with community-based targeting, and categorical targeting 
of children, achieve highly variable results. (3) Categorical targeting of older persons, 
community bidding on social funds, and self-targeting (based on consumption) 
performed worst on average. 
5. Implementation is the single most important determinant of targeting success: Targeting 
improves with implementation capacity (proxied by national income), government 
accountability, and inequality levels. Multiple targeting methods improves targeting 
accuracy, by about 15% for each additional method used. 
 
The last point is well illustrated by Ndihme Ekonomika, a means tested cash transfer 
programme in Albania, where targeting failures in implementation confounded the attribution 
of targeting errors in design. 
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leakage and undercoverage rates show that there are problems of targeting in 
addition to inadequacy of program's design and resources. More than half of the 
beneficiaries are non-poor families. Targeting coefficients are positive but near to 
“0”: even though the program is designed to support poor families, it is approaching 
to be untargeted. 
(Mangiavacchi and Verme 2009: 12) 
 
Grosh and Leite (2009: 176) conclude that: ‘it is more difficult to target narrowly in countries 
with very low incomes’. 
3.3 Targeting errors by targeting mechanism – findings 
The review of targeting errors that follows is organised around alternative targeting 
mechanisms, as defined in section 2.1.2 above. 
 
1. Means testing 
2. Proxy means testing 
3. Categorical targeting 
4. Geographic targeting 
5. Community-based targeting 
6. Self-targeting 
7. Multiple mechanisms 
 
It is important to note that some of the case studies cited below may have subsequently 
refined or changed their targeting methodology, while some of these programmes have also 
implemented one or more rounds of retargeting, that have reduced the targeting errors 
reported here. 
3.3.1 Means tested programmes 
It is axiomatic that there is a trade-off between targeting accuracy and administrative costs of 
targeting (Besley and Kanbur 1990). Means testing is the most data-demanding (and most 
expensive) targeting mechanism, and is assumed to be the most accurate. Yet despite their 
putative potential for accurate identification of poor beneficiaries in theory, means tested 
programmes in practice display high errors of exclusion and inclusion in implementation (see 
Table A1.1 in Appendix 1). 
 
The ‘Ndihme Ekonomika’ (NE), a cash transfer programme in Albania that supports about 
20% of the population, targeted urban households with no other source of income, and rural 
households with small landholdings. These tests accurately identified the poor, with low 
leakages to the non-poor – only 10.1% of the richest 80% of households received NE 
assistance. However, exclusion errors in implementation were high, with 62.6% of 
households in the poorest quintile not receiving NE benefits. This was due to a 25% cut in 
the government’s budget allocation to NE, which imposed a hard budget constraint on local 
communes that administered the programme and resulted in substantial exclusion of eligible 
households (Alderman 2001). 
 
In China, the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee Scheme (MLGS) fails to reach 71% of poor 
households, while 40% of recipients have incomes above the income threshold for eligibility 
(Ravallion 2007). In the Krygyz Republic, two-thirds (69%) of households in the poorest 
quintile do not receive the Unified Monthly Benefit, and more than half the programme 
beneficiaries are from wealthier quintiles (Tesliuc 2004). In Azerbaijan, 88.5% of households 
in the poorest quintile do not receive Children Benefits – none at all in the poorest decile 
(many of these households have no resident children) – while 86.3% of beneficiaries come 
from wealthier quintiles (Habibov and Fan 2006). 
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3.3.2 Proxy means tested programmes 
Proxy means tests are popular on conditional cash transfer programmes (mainly in Latin 
America), but have also been used to identify beneficiaries for social welfare programmes 
(e.g. in Colombia) and food subsidies (e.g. in Egypt), especially in contexts where incomes 
are difficult to assess. In Mongolia, a proxy means test was preferred to an income-based 
means test ‘due to the informal nature of much of the economy, particularly among the 
herding population in the rural areas as well as among many of the urban poor’ (Hodges et 
al. 2007: 10). 
  
How accurately a proxy means test identifies the poor depends on which proxies are applied, 
how they are weighted, as well as how rigorously the beneficiary identification process is 
implemented. In Brazil and Ecuador, conditional cash transfers excluded 45% and 33% of 
poor households respectively (see Table A1.2), one reason being that the conditions are 
applied to children but the poorest households often have no resident children (Fiszbein and 
Schady 2009). In Colombia, a proxy means test (comprising indicators of housing, access to 
public services, education levels, employment status, household composition) determines 
eligibility for a range of social welfare benefits, and misclassification of poor households as 
non-poor (exclusion error) is fairly low at 19%, while misclassification of non-poor households 
as poor (inclusion error) is somewhat higher at 31% (Castañeda 2005). In Egypt, a proxy 
means test was modelled for a food subsidy programme which predicted an exclusion error 
of 28% of poor households and an inclusion error of 16% (Falkingham and Namazie 2002). 
 
A rare case where predicted and actual targeting errors can be compared is the Child Money 
Programme (CMP), Mongolia’s conditional cash transfer programme. Initially, a proxy means 
test was applied, ‘based on a set of indicators for various household characteristics to 
generate a score, which would determine the eligibility of applicant households’ (Hodges et 
al. 2007: 10). Analysis of the proxy means test formula before implementation predicted high 
exclusion error (42%) and inclusion error (38%), because of poor choice of proxy indicators. 
When the CMP was actually implemented, exclusion error was lower than predicted (21%) 
but due to ‘serious shortcomings in implementation’ inclusion error was much higher, with 
more than half the beneficiary households (57%) living above the Minimum Subsistence 
Level. The CMP also allows a rare opportunity for comparison of alternative targeting 
mechanisms, because in 2006 the proxy means test was dropped and the grant became a 
‘universal’ entitlement for all children under 18 years of age. As expected, exclusion error fell 
dramatically (to 8%), mainly poor households without children, or children living outside a 
family (e.g. street children), or because of barriers to access (e.g. lack of documents) by poor 
families. Also as expected, inclusion error increased (to 65%) when the proxy means test 
was lifted, with almost two-thirds of beneficiaries being non-poor (Hodges et al. 2007). 
 
In a recent paper, Kidd and Wylde (2011) provide a review of the strengths and weaknesses 
of PMT targeting. Conducting econometric simulation exercises for Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Rwanda and Sri Lanka, their paper is the first to attempt an in-depth analysis of PMT 
targeting. They show that exclusion and inclusion errors vary between 44% and 55% when 
20% of the population is covered and between 57% and 71% when 10% is covered. In other 
words, the smaller the target group in terms of coverage, the higher the errors. They 
conclude that proxy means tests are subject to considerable inaccuracy due to a range of 
challenges, related to (1) the imperfect correlation between multiple proxies and household 
consumption, (2) the inaccuracy of national household survey, (3) sampling errors in 
household survey design and, (4) difficulties on verifying the actual value of proxies. These 
are all relevant concerns, however, they do not only apply to PMT targeting, but to a range of 
targeting methods that rely on heavy data collection. While Kidd and Wylde do highlight 
many of the weaknesses of PMT, they do not provide a comparative perspective to other 
targeting mechanisms so it is impossible to determine the relative efficiency of PMT targeting 
over other forms of targeting. 
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3.3.3 Categorically targeted programmes 
Programmes using categorical targeting typically identify proxy indicators of poverty or 
vulnerability, often demographic categories such as older persons (social pensions), people 
with disabilities (disability grants), and orphans or ‘vulnerable children’ (child allowances). As 
noted above, targeting errors on categorically targeted programmes can be assessed either 
in terms of whether beneficiaries (and non-beneficiaries) meet the eligibility criteria or 
whether beneficiaries (and non-beneficiaries) are poor. Both options are discussed here, 
according to data availability (Table A1.3). 
 
Categorical targeting tends to be associated with high inclusion and exclusion errors in terms 
of the poverty profile of beneficiaries. For instance, a ‘universal’ social pension is ‘mildly 
progressive in its targeting because households with elderly members are somewhat poorer 
than average, but a substantial share of the benefits would go to the non-poor because many 
of the elderly live in households that are not poor’ (Grosh and Leite 2009: 176). Grosh and 
Leite calculate that 80-88% of older persons live in non-poor households in Kyrgyzstan, 
Niger, Panama and Yemen. Conversely, 78-80% of poor households in these countries have 
no elderly members, so a universal social pension would generate both inclusion and 
exclusion errors of approximately 80%. 
 
The evidence reveals that social pensions are generally effective at reaching older persons, 
but relatively inaccurate in targeting the poor. One global review of ‘universal’ social pension 
programmes found that Bolivia, Mauritius and Samoa have achieved 100% coverage of their 
eligible group; Botswana, Namibia and Mexico City have very low exclusion error (4%, 7% 
and 6% respectively, defined as beneficiaries as a percentage of the age-qualified 
population), while only Brunei and Nepal reach less than 90% of their age-qualified 
population (Willmore 2007). In terms of inclusion error, an assessment of the Old Age 
Allowance in Bangladesh found that 24% of households receiving the grant did not have a 
member aged 60 or above (Slater and Farrington 2009). However, old age was found to be a 
weak proxy for poverty in Azerbaijan. An assessment of the poverty status of social 
pensioners found high inclusion error by design (86% of beneficiaries were not in the poorest 
income quintile) and even higher exclusion error by design (95% of persons in the poorest 
quintile were not benefiting from the programme) (Habibov and Fan 2006). 
 
Three disability grants in Azerbaijan recorded similarly high targeting errors by design (when 
assessed against poverty). Very few households in the poorest quintile benefited from these 
grants, suggesting that there is little correlation between an individual’s disability and their 
household’s income. This is also true for student scholarships, grants for war veterans and 
grants for decorated civilians, military and government personnel (Habibov and Fan 2006). 
 
In several Eastern European transition economies (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia, the 
Russian Federation) categorical targeting is politically more acceptable than means testing, 
but an assessment of categorical benefits such as child allowances and subsidies on public 
services for older citizens and public sector workers found that most poor citizens do not fall 
into these categories, so exclusion errors (by design) are high, ranging from 57% in Hungary 
(where 43% of poor households receive some social assistance), to 94% in Poland (where 
only 6% of poor households receive social assistance). Since these categories are crude 
proxies for poverty, inclusion errors are also high, peaking at 92% in Bulgaria, meaning that 
almost all non-poor households receive social assistance (Fox 2003). 
 
A range of cash and food transfer programmes that target women in Bangladesh specify 
categories of women who are eligible – female-headed households, adults aged between 18 
and 49 years, illiterate persons. Although most programme participants satisfied the age 
eligibility and illiteracy criteria (with inclusion errors ranging from 3% to 11%), the majority of 
households (over 60% in three of the programmes) were not female-headed, suggesting that 
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this criterion was not strictly enforced during beneficiary registration procedures (Ahmed 
2009). 
 
Ghana’s Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme targets ‘ultra-poor’ 
labour-constrained households, but for political reasons (to avoid all LEAP benefits being 
disbursed in geographically isolated and politically marginal regions) a uniform proportion of 
beneficiaries was selected across all administrative districts. This effectively imposed a quota 
which resulted in exclusion errors (under-selection) in poor districts and inclusion errors 
(over-selection) in wealthier districts. Across all rural districts more than a third of eligible 
households were excluded by the quota (exclusion error =36%). In urban centres, the quota 
resulted in almost three times as many non-poor as poor beneficiaries being registered 
(inclusion error =73.4%) (Ellis 2009). 
3.3.4 Geographically targeted programmes 
Geographical targeting is most effective in contexts where poverty rates are high and poverty 
is spatially concentrated, as Handa and Davis (2006) explain: 
 
poverty rates among targeted communities in Nicaragua and rural Mexico are 
around 70%. In these situations the additional cost of individual targeting has been 
shown to yield little in terms of efficiency … as the program expands to less poor 
areas geographic targeting may no longer be viable and the relative benefit of 
household targeting will increase. 
(Handa and Davis 2006: 11) 
 
Related to this is the ‘granularity’ issue: the poverty targeting accuracy of geographical 
targeting generally improves, the smaller the area where blanket coverage is applied. 
Typically there is not enough information to do this, as household surveys might report 
disaggregated poverty incidence to province level, but not to districts or communes. This 
problem can be resolved by ‘small area estimation’, but again this demands data that may be 
available only infrequently – e.g. by combining LSMS-type sample surveys with census data 
(which is typically available only every 10 years) for each individual. 
 
Nonetheless, geographically targeted programmes are associated with relatively high 
inclusion and (especially) exclusion errors by design, because even if some regions within a 
country are poorer than others on average, physical location is a weak proxy for individual 
poverty, and poor households tend to be scattered throughout the country. As Manasan and 
Cuenca (2007: 8) observe: ‘geographically targeting works best when poverty differs across 
regions but is similar within regions’. But geographic targeting also ignores the population 
distribution, and especially the concentration of people in urban centres. For example, if 20% 
of urban residents are poor this can exceed the numbers of poor people in remote rural 
districts where 70+% of residents are poor, but the urban poor tend to be overlooked by 
programmes that target on headcount poverty rates by district. 
 
In Vietnam, anti-poverty programmes are targeted at communes officially designated as poor 
or remote. Few non-poor people live in these communes, so inclusion error is low (7.7%). 
However, ‘the vast majority of poor people in Vietnam do not live in an officially designated 
poor or remote commune’ (Minot and Baulch 2002: 36), so exclusion error is extremely high 
(80.5%) (Table A1.4). 
3.3.5 Community-based targeted programmes 
Community participation in selecting beneficiaries has the advantage of drawing on local 
knowledge of individual circumstances, thereby avoiding the cost of individual assessment 
mechanisms and the inaccuracy of categorical or geographic targeting. Specifically, 
community-based targeting is asserted to: (1) improve the accuracy of beneficiary 
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identification (by reducing information asymmetries); (2) reduce the costs of identifying 
eligible beneficiaries; (3) improve the social acceptability of targeting decisions (by 
transferring ownership of these decisions to the community); (4) contribute to community 
mobilisation. On the other hand, involving communities in targeting runs the risk of ‘elite 
capture’ of programme benefits (much depends on whether community structures are 
genuinely democratic, inclusive and accountable),5 they require small, cohesive communities 
(where everyone knows each other and no sub-groups are socially marginalised by the 
majority), and they are difficult to scale up from the community to the regional or national 
level. 
 
This review draws a distinction between delegation and devolution in community-based 
targeting, as elaborated by Conning and Kevane (2002). 
 
A center or principal delegates responsibility for candidate selection and benefit 
delivery to local community groups when the principal contracts to use the 
delegated intermediary agent’s better information and access to local networks to 
carry out the principal's objectives. … By way of contrast, when the center devolves 
responsibility to local communities, it transfers not only resources but also 
responsibility for setting the criteria by which eligibility and assistance level will be 
judged. 
(Conning and Kevane 2002: 381) 
 
In short, either communities identify beneficiaries based on criteria pre-defined by 
administrators (‘delegated community-based targeting’), or communities select beneficiaries 
based on their own criteria (‘devolved community-based targeting’). Each approach has 
different implications for targeting outcomes and for comparability of targeting accuracy. 
Under ‘delegated’ approaches it is possible to compare targeting outcomes against 
administrative approaches, because the eligibility criteria are clear and absolute. Under 
‘devolved’ approaches, targeting outcomes are not comparable across communities, 
because they are based on relative assessments – so the poorest 10% in a rich community 
may well be better off than the poorest 10% in a rich village. 
 
An additional complication arises when a quota is applied, as when communities are asked 
to identify ‘the poorest 20% of households’. This approach is commonly adopted by NGOs 
faced with binding budget constraints. Setting such a stringent quota tends to generate high 
exclusion errors (by design) – if poverty in the community is 60% then a 20% quota will only 
reach a maximum of one-third of the poor. 
3.3.5.1 Delegated community-based targeting 
On Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer programme communities were asked to identify 
households that were ‘ultra-poor’ and labour-constrained (defined as dependency ratio>3, or 
no working aged adult, or the adult has a chronic illness or disability). This ‘delegated’ 
approach proved effective in terms of outreach, reaching over 90% of households in the 
poorest expenditure quintile (exclusion error by design <10%). But a quarter of beneficiaries 
were not labour-constrained (inclusion error in implementation (against eligibility criteria) 
=24%) (Miller et al. 2010). 
 
Peru’s ‘Glass of Milk’ subsidy programme had high exclusion errors in terms of reaching poor 
people, because the target groups that local communities were asked to identify were 
narrowly specified and not always directly related to poverty status: poor children (44% of 
households with children aged 3-11), households with pregnant or lactating women, and 
                                                 
5 A review of evidence on community-based and community-driven development initiatives found that: “The targeting of poor 
communities and poor households within communities is markedly worse in more unequal communities, particularly when 
the distribution of power is concentrated within elites” (Mansuri and Rao 2004: 55). 
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people with tuberculosis. Half of all poor households did not benefit from this programme 
(51.4%), but exclusion error was lower among poor households with children under 7 years 
old (38.2%). Inclusion error, however, was low (16.8%) (Stifel and Alderman 2003). 
 
Save the Children’s ‘Community-Managed Targeting and Distribution’ methodology (CMTD) 
has been used to identify beneficiaries for general food distributions in several countries. 
Proxies for food insecurity are derived from qualitative research in each local context, and 
usually include thresholds for land and livestock ownership. The CMTD methodology 
generated low inclusion errors in terms of meeting the administratively-defined eligibility 
criteria – only 5-12% of beneficiaries in Tanzania and 10-13% in Zimbabwe were 
‘inappropriately targeted’ (Mathys 2004: 4) (Table A1.5). 
3.3.5.2 Devolved community-based targeting 
Two programmes in our review devolved responsibility for identifying beneficiaries to 
communities. On Malawi’s Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme communities were asked to 
identify their most vulnerable members. Criteria included: being elderly, weak and vulnerable; 
orphans, widows and female-headed households keeping orphans; ‘households with multiple 
problems’; disabled; household head is chronically ill or household is caring for sick people. 
An assessment of beneficiaries’ poverty status found that inclusion error by design was 
extremely low, at 5%. Using a social mapping technique, ‘95% of the targeted households for 
agricultural inputs were poor’ (Mgemezulu 2008: 84). However, exclusion error in 
implementation was very high, at 67%, not because the targeting mechanism was weak but 
because budget constraints resulted in substantial undercoverage of eligible households. 
‘Ideally these households should have been included because they satisfy the selection 
criteria. However, due to limited quota only 33% of the deserving households were targeted’ 
(Mgemezulu 2008: 84). 
 
Rwanda’s ‘Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme’ (VUP) uses a ‘traditional’ social mapping 
process at village level called ‘Ubudehe’ to classify households into a number of wealth 
categories (usually six). It then takes all households in the bottom two wealth categories, 
applies land ownership as a criterion, and labour to identify which households were eligible 
for Direct Support and which were eligible for Public Works employment. However, access to 
Public Works was also rationed because of budget constraints. A comparison of the ‘social 
poverty’ mechanism against findings from a household poverty survey found that inclusion 
error (households in the bottom two ‘Ubudehe’ categories that were above the ‘extreme 
income poverty line’ or the ‘extreme human poverty line’) was 21.1%. Exclusion error was 
much higher, at 60.0%, because large numbers of extremely income poor or human poor 
households are clustered in the third ‘Ubudehe’ wealth category, but these households are 
not included on the VUP because of budget constraints (Asselin 2010). It should be noted 
that this data only considers eligibility numbers, not actual beneficiary numbers, and does not 
take account of other targeting criteria (land ownership) and rationing of Public Works. 
3.3.6 Self-targeted programmes 
The most common application of self-targeting is on public works programmes, where the 
labour requirement and a low wage rate combine to deter non-poor individuals from applying 
for work opportunities. However, where poverty is widespread and employment opportunities 
are limited, these screening mechanisms are inadequate and public works employment is 
often rationed, so inclusion and exclusion errors can both be higher than predicted.  
 
In Ethiopia, where the poverty headcount stood at approximately 24 million in 2006 (34% of 
the population), the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) reached about 8 million 
people, or roughly one-third of the poor – an ‘inherent exclusion rate’ in implementation 
(Sharp, Brown and Teshome 2006: 21) of at least 67% – because of limited resources. The 
PSNP combines self-targeting with government-defined indicators of food insecurity – it is 
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targeted at food insecure rather than poor households, with 3+ months of food shortage in 
the previous year being the indicator of food insecurity. An assessment of targeting accuracy 
in 2006 found that ‘88% of beneficiaries and 70% of non-beneficiaries reported experiencing 
three or more months of food shortage in the preceding year’, so inclusion error was 12% 
and exclusion error was 70% (Sharp, Brown and Teshome 2006: 23) (Table A1.6). 
 
The PSNP exemplifies the problem of ‘under-coverage’ (which is common not only on self-
targeted programmes) – where exclusion does not reflect a failure of the targeting 
mechanism, but inadequate resources to reach all poor people. Since the PSNP reaches 
only one-third of poor Ethiopians, a more relevant indicator of its poverty targeting accuracy 
would consider where beneficiaries are located on the income distribution: are they drawn 
from the ‘poorest of the poor’, are they clustered close to the poverty line, or are they 
scattered randomly among the poor? Assessing this adjusted poverty incidence rate would 
require shifting the poverty line downwards for the specific purpose of PSNP assessment, to 
calculate more realistic inclusion and exclusion errors, or disaggregating poverty data and 
looking at inclusion and exclusion errors by decile. 
3.3.7 Multiple targeting mechanisms 
Many social transfer programmes use a combination of two or more targeting methods or 
mechanisms, either simultaneously (e.g. individuals must satisfy both a categorical age test 
and an income test to qualify for a means tested social pension), or sequentially (e.g. poor 
geographical areas are identified, then poor households are selected within these areas), or 
in parallel (i.e. different mechanisms are used to target different beneficiary groups for the 
same programme). Multiple mechanisms complicate the assessment of targeting accuracy, 
because it is not possible to attribute targeting errors to any single mechanism (Table A1.7). 
3.3.7.1 Simultaneous mechanisms 
A study of Uruguay’s National Social Emergency Plan, a social cash transfer that applied 
both a means test and a proxy means test,6 found that 21.6% of eligible households did not 
apply for the programme, mainly because of various transactions costs incurred in the 
application process (Burdin and de Melo 2009). Means tests and proxy means tests are not 
only administratively complex to implement, they also add more complexity and costs for 
applicants than other targeting mechanisms such as categorical, geographic, or self-
targeting. 
 
South Africa’s Disability Grant requires all applicants to pass both a means test and a 
disability test. Though inclusion and exclusion errors on the programme are substantial, at 
17% and 49% (based only on the disability test), they compare favourably with international 
experience: ‘disability targeting error rates are comparable to those of disability programs in 
developed countries with more administrative capacity’ (Mitra 2010: 19). Two studies in the 
United States, one based on medical checks and the other on self-reported disability, found 
inclusion and exclusion error rates of 19% and 48%, and 20% and 60%, respectively. 
Inclusion errors on South Africa’s Disability Grant by poverty status are low at 5%; but 
exclusion by poverty is very high at 89%, because of the stringent application of disability 
eligibility tests. 
3.3.7.2 Sequential mechanisms 
Many unconditional and conditional cash transfers use ‘sequential’ mechanisms, first defining 
the geographical boundaries of the programme (e.g. rural areas, or the poorest districts), 
then identifying eligible households by applying a proxy means test or community-based 
                                                 
6  Applicants first completed an income declaration form (the means test), then government officials visited each household 
and scored them on a list of characteristics (the proxy means test). Out of 131,000 applicants, about 80,000 were admitted 
into the programme on the basis of their proxy means test scores (Burdin and de Melo, 2009: 148). 
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targeting. A review of 38 conditional cash transfer programmes found that: ‘About two thirds 
of countries use geographic targeting; about two thirds use household targeting, mostly via 
proxy means testing; and many countries use both. Moreover, many programs use 
community-based targeting or community vetting of eligibility lists to increase transparency’ 
(Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 70). 
3.3.7.3 Parallel mechanisms 
Nicaragua’s conditional cash transfer, ‘Red de Proteccion Social’, uses two targeting 
methods in different areas: 
 
Nicaragua’s RPS used two targeting approaches for selecting beneficiaries: In most 
comarcas selected for the first phase, where about 80 percent of households fell 
below the poverty line, all households were eligible for the program (... about 6 
percent were later excluded based on their resources). In a smaller number of 
comarcas where poverty rates were lower, household eligibility was assessed with 
a proxy means test that identified households above and below the poverty line. In 
these comarcas, the average poverty rate was 75 percent, meaning that about 25 
percent of households were excluded... In comarcas where geographical targeting 
was employed, almost all poor and extremely poor households received benefits. 
The ‘undercoverage’ rate (households that were defined as poor but did not receive 
benefits) was only about 3 percent, while the ‘leakage’ rate (households in 
geographically-targeted comarcas defined as non-poor but receiving program 
benefits) was only 14 percent. In household-targeted comarcas, undercoverage 
was estimated as 3 percent and 10 percent among extremely poor and poor 
households, respectively, while leakage was similarly estimated to be 17 percent 
and 6 percent, respectively. 
(Adato 2008: 15) 
 
As might be expected, exclusion errors were lower under geographical targeting than 
household targeting, but inclusion errors were also higher when poor households were 
targeted using a proxy means test, which is rather surprising.7 
 
This use of differentiated targeting is a logical strategy, given different characteristics of the 
population in different locations. It is unusual for multiple mechanisms to be used on a single 
programme, but this case suggests that such a strategy should be considered more often. 
4 Costs of targeting 
The process of targeting often requires a large amount of information to be collected – 
though this varies by targeting mechanism – in order to identify the eligible and screen out 
the ineligible. This can absorb a substantial portion of the programme’s budget. Targeting is 
often perceived as a costly activity, and the more accurate it is, the more expensive it is – 
Besley and Kanbur (1990) hypothesised that targeting costs rise faster than targeting 
accuracy. Any assessment of targeting cost-effectiveness must weigh up this ‘trade-off’ 
between rising expenditure against improved accuracy in terms of the identification of the 
‘correct’ (i.e. eligible) beneficiaries. 
                                                 
7  Note that error rates reported in case study #14 (Maluccio, 2009) and case study #20 (Adato, 2008) in Table A1.7 are very 
similar because the same survey data was used by both authors. 
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4.1 Targeting costs 
Apart from the direct administrative costs of targeting, targeting may have a number of 
secondary effects on both the targeted and untargeted populations, some of which introduce 
other forms of costs. Secondary effects can be positive, as for example when social transfers 
made to one vulnerable category (older persons) also benefit another vulnerable category 
(children) (Case and Deaton 1998). Targeting may generate other secondary benefits, such 
as sensitising local populations to the disadvantage faced by particular groups, or – if 
community-based targeting is used – involving communities in decision-making processes 
about policy interventions that are intended to benefit them. 
 
However, many secondary effects of targeting are negative. Sen (1995), for example, 
mentions information distortions (people acting as poor in order to obtain benefits); incentive 
distortions (beneficiaries and would-be beneficiaries losing motivation to work); social stigma 
(beneficiaries who ‘depend on handouts’ losing the respect of their neighbours); and 
politicisation (manipulation of targeting for political gain). 
 
A full cost analysis of targeting should cover all these costs and consequences. This chapter 
reviews the available evidence on administrative costs, private costs (travel costs, 
opportunity costs, etc.), social costs (e.g. erosion of community cohesion), psycho-social 
costs (such as stigma and loss of self-esteem), political costs (loss of political support) and 
incentive-based costs (e.g. behavioural change to meet eligibility criteria). 
 
A poverty-targeted scheme can be evaluated using the benchmark of a comparable universal 
programme. Which option is more cost-effective, a social benefit targeted to the poor or 
transfers provided universally? The answer depends partly on the costs of targeting, which in 
turn are determined by a range of political, social, institutional, administrative and economic 
factors. 
 
Targeting involves a range of public, private and indirect costs, which vary from country to 
country and depend on the targeting method chosen. The direct financial cost is the 
administrative expense incurred by the managing authority in implementing the targeting 
mechanisms. Private costs include both financial expenses and other resources and 
opportunities foregone by applicants and others complying with the targeting requirements. 
Indirect costs include political, economic, social and psycho-social losses. 
 
Many of the studies analysed in this literature review recognise a broad range of costs 
imposed by targeting. Ferreira-Coimbra and Forteza (2005: 697) cite ‘large administrative 
costs, corruption, distortions of incentives to save, and social stigma.’ Dutrey (2007) lists 
indirect costs including loss of political support, stigmatisation, incentive gaps, lost social 
capital/cohesion, corruption and clientelism. Samson et al. (2006) consolidates similar 
typologies from the targeting literature into a framework including the full range of targeting 
costs reviewed in this study. The following sections synthesise the assessments of costs by 
type: administrative, private, social, psycho-social, political and incentive-based. 
 
4.2 Administrative costs 
Targeting systems require people, skill, time and money. A means test, for example, will 
often require repeated verification of the income or assets of households in order to decide 
whether they should receive benefits. The dynamics of poverty in many countries 
significantly increase the cost of targeting. When people move in and out of poverty 
frequently, appropriate targeting requires regular assessment of the targeting criteria. 
Baulch’s (2002: 22) literature review reports estimates of the administrative costs of the 
targeting process in Latin American social transfer programmes, which range between 6% 
and 9% of total programme costs. Similarly, Grosh, del Ninno, Tesliuc and Ouerghi (2008, 
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Table 4.2) report targeting costs in the range of 0.6% to 6.3% of total programme costs, for 
eight social transfer programmes in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Targeting can absorb 
most of a programme’s administrative budget, but Grosh et al. (2008) found that 
administrative costs averaged only 8.5% of total costs for 25 cash or near cash programmes, 
so targeting is rarely prohibitively costly. 
 
Van der Berg, Siebrits and Lekezwa (2010: 12) provide similarly low figures, estimating 
administrative costs of targeting at 3–8% of the value of transfers, and acknowledging that 
costs increase with attempts to increase targeting accuracy. They point out that the fixed 
costs of targeting may undermine the cost-effectiveness of providing very small benefits. 
Baulch’s literature review (2002: 22) likewise identifies that varying approaches to targeting 
will incur different administrative costs, with finer targeting requiring higher administrative 
costs. Administrative costs are determined by two factors: (1) the intensity of targeting and 
other related administrative procedures (measured as cost-per-beneficiary), and (2) the 
scope of the targeting process, measured as the total number of participants in the 
programme. If the intensity effect is sufficiently smaller than the scope effect, finer targeting 
will be less expensive than universal approaches (Sluchynsky 2009: 211-212). 
 
Castañeda and Lindert (2005) provides one of the few studies that explicitly estimates the 
direct administrative costs of targeting, but this only covers the household interview costs 
associated with the registration process, and using both unverified and proxy means 
testing. The estimates exclude the cost of system design and implementation, as well as 
hardware and the various case management responsibilities associated with targeting. The 
measured direct targeting costs are low – ranging between 0.7% and 1.4% of benefit values. 
The costs are summarised in Table 4.1 below. 
 
Table 4.1. Targeting interview costs in Latin America 
Country 
People 
registered 
(millions) 
Interview cost 
Cost per benefit 
targeted (%) Urban Rural 
Chile (Ficha CAS) 5.6 $8.40 1.3% 
Colombia (SISBEN) 27.0 $1.80 $2.90 0.5% 
Costa Rica (SIPO) 1.0 $4.20 $7.00 0.9% 
Mexico (Oportunidades registry) 36.9 $4.90 $6.80 0.7% 
Brazil (Cadastro Unico) 29.0 $3.90 1.4% 
Source: Castañeda and Lindert (2005: 42) 
 
There is a frequent recognition in the literature that means testing (including proxy means 
testing) is more costly than categorical targeting and possibly community-based approaches. 
Targeting costs in a sample of middle-income countries averaged 4% of total programme 
costs, but ranged between 25% and 75% of total administrative costs (Grosh and Leite 2009: 
5). Ha, Chai and Alviar (2010: 5) argue that verified means testing is expensive in terms of 
administrative costs but also requires linkages to the tax system which is challenging in 
developing countries. Administrative costs are higher if the targeting approach requires time-
consuming and difficult verification processes. Coady and Parker’s (2009: 24) literature 
review identifies widespread misreporting by households of socio-economic characteristics 
that determine their eligibility for the Oportunidades programme. Benfield (2007: 7) notes that 
high administrative costs of targeting may reduce the resources available to finance the 
benefits. 
 
These relatively high costs of means testing (including proxy means testing) influence 
governments’ decisions on the choice of targeting mechanisms. Coady and Parker (2009: 5) 
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point out the choice of a first-stage self-targeting approach in Mexico’s Oportunidades 
programme was influenced by the relatively high costs of proxy means testing in an urban 
environment with a low percentage of eligible households. Schady (2002: 2) points out that 
geographic targeting likewise appeals to programme designers because of its 
administrative simplicity, which also makes it relatively inexpensive to implement. Standing 
(2007) argues that benefits from universal security schemes (such as categorical social 
pensions) are administratively simple and low-cost, as has been demonstrated by Namibia’s 
social pension: ‘The costs are equivalent to about 30 US cents per person per month, also 
remarkably low by comparison with other systems’ (Standing 2007:21). 
 
Conning and Kevane (2002: 378) argue that community-based approaches may be less 
expensive to administer because ‘community groups may have better information for 
identification of needs, and households may in turn have less incentive or opportunity to 
provide false information on assets, income or shocks.’ Self-targeting and community based 
approaches are identified as low-cost options when analysts focus only on the on-budget 
administrative costs of the respective programmes. 
 
The limited available literature suggests that the administrative costs of targeting vary 
substantially by methodological approach, but few studies have attempted to rigorously 
quantify the full range of administrative costs, particularly the common off-budget costs that 
accompany some of the schemes. 
 
This review found one study that carefully compared the direct targeting cost of different 
methodologies on a consistent basis, using an approach that combined fieldwork with 
simulation analysis. The study corroborates this review’s findings of the data limitations for 
the analysis of targeting costs. 
 
There is little quantitative literature on the costs of targeting and one major 
constraint to cost estimation is that programme budgets and expenditure reports do 
not generally provide breakdowns by process (i.e. the costs of programme design, 
M&E, targeting, etc.). Neither donor budget and expenditure formats nor 
implementing agency ERP reports provide budget or expenditure breakdowns that 
allow us to understand which resources have been used specifically for targeting. 
The lack of data on targeting costs limits our ability to compare different targeting 
options. 
(Watkins 2008: 14) 
 
The figure below depicts the total costs of alternative targeting approaches simulated for 
Zambia, broken down into the direct financial costs of targeting and estimates for the 
opportunity costs of the time contributed by uncompensated community officials and 
households. 
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Figure 4.1. Simulated costs of alternative targeting approaches for Zambia 
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Source: Authors’ calculations with data from Watkins (2008: 51). 
 
The costs Watkins simulates are influenced by a number of strong assumptions. First, he 
assumes a very low opportunity cost (equal to the daily rural wage rate for unskilled labour) 
for volunteers and community officials not financially compensated by the programme. This 
disproportionately favours the cost measure for community-based targeting. Second, he 
adopts the more expensive survey-outreach approach for categorical targeting, with 
associated high training costs, even though the more cost-effective on-demand registration 
approach is typically adopted for this targeting methodology in most countries. Third, the 
geographic targeting approach assumes a new survey must be conducted, rather than 
employ an existing household survey. Fourth, the analysis assumes a very high accuracy for 
means testing (80–90%), while acknowledging ‘the accuracy of means testing is unknown’ 
(Watkins 2008: 52). While these may or may not be appropriate in Zambia’s case, as with 
any simulation approach, the results depend critically on these assumptions. The relative 
costs of targeting approaches in other countries may vary substantially, depending on the 
assumptions reflecting the appropriate institutional contexts. 
 
Finally, in cases where a single targeting mechanism is used to target multiple benefits, it is 
appropriate to think differently about assigning targeting and administration costs to each 
programme. Examples include Brazil’s Cadastro Unico, Colombia’s SISBEN and India’s BPL 
card. Crudely, if a ‘single registry’ is used to target three social transfers to one household, 
one-third of the targeting costs should be assigned to each programme. 
4.3 Private costs 
Private costs arise as potential beneficiaries expend resources to comply with the 
programme’s targeting criteria. Sometimes the process is perceived to be too difficult to 
navigate alone. Potential beneficiaries incur direct costs in order to demonstrate their 
eligibility. Private costs include expenses for transportation to apply for benefits, time 
expended in transit and in queues (with the associated loss of income or other foregone 
opportunities) and the fees for obtaining necessary documentation. Coady and Parker (2009: 
6) recognise that private costs associated with the targeting process can both reduce the net 
benefits to participating households as well as create a self-selection process which can 
exclude eligible participants for whom private costs exceed the expected [present value of 
the] benefits. 
 
Corruption on the part of administering authorities increases the private costs to participants 
who must pay bribes or non-statutory fees to secure their entitlements. Programmes without 
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transparent targeting mechanisms fail to provide ‘claimable’ entitlements and increase the 
risk of corruption. 
 
For example, a study of social pension payments in Karnataka, India found that ‘high 
transaction costs are incurred during an application process that involves producing several 
proofs and certificates to be submitted to a village accountant. The study shows that a not 
insignificant share of applicants (especially illiterate [older] persons and widows) choose to 
rely on a middleman to prepare their applications, help arrange the required certification, and 
file the claim’ (Sluchynsky 2009: 207). Different types of programmes impose varying kinds 
of private costs. 
 
For means-tested programmes, the main costs involve time and transportation to what is 
usually an on-demand registration centre, and the costs of obtaining certification to verify 
compliance with the eligibility requirements. Hunter and Adato (2007: 53-54) describe the 
findings from interviews with caregivers eligible for but not receiving the Child Support Grant 
in South Africa. Applicants share their perceptions that the grant is difficult to secure, with 
transport costs to the relevant government offices ranging from R16 (US$2.30) to R26 
(US$3.70) and multiple trips usually required. Uncertainty about application success and long 
processing delays can reduce the expected value of benefits.8 
 
For community based targeting approaches, potential participants often meet with 
community members in extended exercises aimed at identifying the poorest and most 
vulnerable, imposing the opportunity cost of the productive activities foregone through 
engagement in the process (Lembani 2006: 23). 
 
Conditional programmes – including traditional conditional cash transfer programmes that 
impose human capital investment requirements as well as public works programmes – have 
much higher private costs, if the compliance with the associated conditionalities is 
considered as part of the targeting process. For example, requiring hard labour for low 
wages in order to screen out the non-poor is a typical self-targeting mechanism in public 
works programmes. This review, however, does not include these costs in the framework on 
targeting costs. 
 
Self-targeting requires time costs, because these approaches often use queuing as a filter 
(Lembani 2006: 23). 
 
Arguing against targeting in general, Standing (2007: 29) argues that more universal 
approaches leave relatively little scope for bureaucratic abuse, discretionary behaviour or 
petty corruption, reducing the burden of private costs on beneficiaries. 
4.4 Social costs 
Social costs from targeting include a possible deterioration of community cohesiveness and 
the potential erosion of informal support networks. Mgemezulu (2008: 75) reports that 
community members are reluctant to target because they fear future repercussion from the 
excluded. The poorest often depend on better off households, who are more likely to be 
excluded in the targeting process, and they may reciprocate by not providing assistance to 
the included poor in the future. 
 
Targeting creates a clear division between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, 
potentially increasing social tension and reducing productive cooperative behaviour (Ha, 
Chai and Alviar 2010: 4; Slater and Mphale 2008: 10). In particular, community-based 
                                                 
8 In the years after Hunter and Adato (2007) was published, the government substantially streamlined the application 
process, reducing documentation requirements and rolling out a system for same-day registration in many offices across 
South Africa. 
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approaches are vulnerable to nepotism and other forms of elite capture, undermining social 
cohesion and breeding resentment (‘hatred’) within participating communities (Ha, Chai and 
Alviar 2010: 5). Conversely, Standing (2007: 29) argues that universal benefit schemes (such 
as categorical social pensions) can build social solidarity, strengthen community and social 
cohesion, and may even assist in developing a sense of national pride. However, no 
empirical evidence is provided that demonstrates these effects. 
 
Adato (2000: 31-32) identifies a number of social costs from targeting processes in Progresa, 
a large conditional cash transfer programme in Mexico. Non-beneficiaries, for example, 
expressed their resentment at being excluded by resisting payment of their school fees. For 
example, the school director in Querétero reported this response to a request for school fees: 
‘Ask those who receive Progresa first.’ Poverty targeting produces envy and division, with 
non-beneficiaries self-excluding themselves from participation in community activities more 
generally because of their exclusion from Progresa. This may have a substantial negative 
impact on social capital erosion. ‘One or more of these problems was reported in 
approximately 80% of the focus groups, and 75% of the doctors’ interviews (some more 
serious than others).’ 
 
Jaspars and Maxwell (2008) warn that the backlash to targeting food aid can result in or 
exacerbate violent conflict within the communities and reduce human security. This can 
include physical attacks, looting and theft, and the conflict is more prevalent when community 
members are not consulted. In Somalia in 2007, for instance ‘WFP reported 15 major 
security incidents at food distributions, in which 10 militia were killed, 10 civilians were killed, 
and 350 metric tons of food remain unrecovered from looting’ (Jaspars and Maxwell 2008: 
25). In this context, the World Food Programme (WFP) faces a difficult dilemma. They worry 
that community leaders will skew food distribution towards politically aligned groups. But if 
the WFP does not consult with local stakeholders, the perceived lack of transparency 
increases the risk of backlash. 
 
There are fewer distinctions across methodologies in terms of social costs. Coady (2006: 14) 
highlights the issue of proxy means testing in Mexico causing ‘substantial social conflict 
within communities.’ Hodges et al. (2007: 30) reports that the administrative processes for 
Mongolia’s Child Money Programme had created tensions among families. Conning and 
Kevane (2002: 378) point out that community-based targeting approaches may ‘lead to, or 
increase, conflict and divisions within the community’. 
 
The social context for targeting appears to be a significant factor in determining the extent of 
social costs. Handa and Davis (2006: 11) suggest that Progresa’s experience indicates that 
‘individual targeting in small communities with high poverty rates can lead to social conflict 
within the community’. Mathys (2004: 24) points out that tensions about targeting are 
intensified when communities perceive that the allocated benefits are wholly insufficient for 
addressing the critical vulnerabilities. 
 
Even simulation exercises meant to identify appropriate design issues can impose social 
costs. Chinsinga (2005: 721) reports that community members in Malawi resented the 
simulation of targeting exercises, perceiving these to make a mockery of their poverty. 
Researchers and non-governmental organisations in Malawi raise expectations but have 
rarely adequately delivered, leading to resentment of outsiders by poor communities. 
 
Lack of transparency appears to be a central theme, as a factor that raises social costs. In 
his assessment of the agricultural input subsidy programme in Malawi, Mgemezulu (2008: 
87) reports that lack of transparency contributed to community perceptions that local leaders 
and extension workers had stolen coupons meant for the community. Secrecy in targeting 
approaches increased suspicion and mistrust. In one village, resentful members destroyed 
benefit vouchers. In another the community leader was murdered. Community leaders 
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subsequently decided to distribute benefits universally among members, avoiding the tension 
and resentment associated with exclusion. 
 
In the very different context of Progresa in Mexico, Adato (2000: 18) attributes some of the 
tension, conflict and social division described above to community members lacking an 
understanding of the basis for some households receiving benefits and others being 
excluded. Poverty reinforces a common identity that supports social solidarity, and the new 
and artificially imposed distinctions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries create 
resentment. 
 
Mechanisms that introduce rights of redress to social transfer programmes may reduce 
social costs, by increasing the perceived legitimacy of targeting approaches. Mgemezulu 
(2008: 90) notes that the destruction of input vouchers and the murder of an official in Malawi 
reflect community members’ frustrations with legitimate channels of redress, and intensify 
long-term tensions because of the time it takes for the resulting social scars to heal. 
Castañeda and Lindert (2005) suggest that providing potential beneficiaries with a ‘voice’ in 
the targeting process can increase their empowerment within the community and reduce 
social costs. 
 
Pritchett, Sumarto and Suryahadi (2002: 25) report that communities address this problem of 
social cost with more universal approaches to distribution. Even when Indonesia’s rice 
distribution programme allocated rations based on the number of eligible households 
according to centrally established poverty targeting guidelines, in practice community leaders 
allocated a more limited quantity to nearly twice the number of eligible households, rejecting 
the national guidelines for targeting the poorest. ‘Community leaders argue that the targeted 
distribution of this central government benefit is inconsistent with the spirit of community 
solidarity and self-help. The village heads point out that, if everyone is expected to contribute 
their labour to community projects, then everyone should also benefit from the unexpected 
windfall of assistance from the central government’ (Pritchett, Sumarto and Suryahadi 2002: 
41). 
 
When Chinsinga (2005: 19-20) tested community attitudes to alternative targeting 
mechanisms for safety net programmes in rural Malawi, his findings echoed those from 
Mexico and Indonesia. ‘The sentiment that everybody is poor was apparently motivated by 
the fear that the selection process would either create or exacerbate social tensions in the 
communities. This fear consequently put communities on the defensive arguing, “we are all 
poor and we all need assistance”.’ 
4.5 Psycho-social costs 
Potential psycho-social costs from targeting include stigma and the exacerbation of negative 
self-perceptions grounded in the participants’ experience with the programme. While the 
provision of transfers can improve economic independence and reduce the impact of stigma, 
policy stances that reinforce negative stereotypes could increase the psychological costs of 
the targeting process. Self-targeting frequently employs stigma to discourage non-poor (and 
even poor) people from taking up the benefits. Stecklov, Winters, Todd and Regalia (2006) 
report that, in Mexico, where census data are used to establish eligibility for Progresa, ‘some 
people do not answer the census or give incorrect information because they feel ashamed to 
admit their poverty.’ Likewise, Dutrey (2007: 9) argues that targeting can stigmatise 
beneficiaries. 
 
Psycho-social costs depend critically on choices by programme designers. For example, a 
cash transfer to older people termed a ‘social assistance scheme’ will likely create more 
stigma than if it is called a ‘social pension’. (Grosh and Leite 2009: 5) Sluchynsky (2009: 207) 
cautions that exploiting stigma deliberately for self-targeting can backfire, discouraging 
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otherwise eligible claimants from taking up benefits they require. Lembani (2006: 22-23) 
reinforces this argument, adding that in-kind transfers that distribute ‘inferior goods’ leave 
participants at risk of social ridicule, increasing the likelihood they will drop out of the 
programme or not participate in the first place. Van der Berg, Siebrits and Lekezwa (2010: 
13) find that some poor children refuse to participate in poverty-targeted school feeding 
programmes in South Africa due to the associated stigma, suggesting universal benefits 
better balance the trade-off between inclusion and exclusion errors. 
 
Stigma sometimes arises in unexpected ways. Adato (2000: 14-15) finds that not being 
included in a programme can be stigmatising. This sentiment was articulated by a community 
member in Michoacán who was excluded from Progresa: ‘In my community, let me tell you 
that the persons that were not chosen tell me that they are never lucky for anything, that 
people who were chosen were people who really have good luck. And I told them it wasn't 
true.’ In other cases stigma simply is not an important issue. Castañeda (2005: 31) reports 
that community members make every effort to be included in the SISBEN programme and 
there is no associated stigma. 
 
Appropriate design and effective implementation can reduce stigma. BRAC organizes 
beneficiaries into weekly meetings in order to reduce social isolation and build self-respect 
and self-confidence (Slater and Farrington 2009: 40). Geographic targeting automatically 
minimises the incidence of stigma, because everyone in local communities within targeted 
districts receives transfers. Similarly, Standing (2007: 29) argues that only universal schemes 
are non-stigmatising, because they do not single out the poor. 
4.6 Political costs 
Targeting the poor can also introduce political costs, primarily by excluding middle class 
beneficiaries who could lend their support to social transfers. Gelbach and Pritchett (1997) 
claim that the greater the degree of marginalisation of the poor, the more likely that effective 
poverty targeting will reduce the total resources transferred to the poor. As Sen argued: ‘The 
beneficiaries of thoroughly targeted poverty-alleviation programmes are often quite weak 
politically and may lack the clout to sustain the programmes and maintain the quality of 
services offered. Benefits meant exclusively for the poor often end up being poor benefits’ 
(Sen 1995: 14). Similarly, Benfield (2007: 7) warns that poverty targeting can cause political 
support to ‘evaporate’. 
 
It is extremely difficult to measure and quantify political costs, and there is little hard evidence 
to validate these assertions, most of which remain as untested hypotheses. Nonetheless, 
there is a strong consensus on the importance of political costs. Kakwani and Subbarao 
(2005: 43), quoting Subbarao et al. (1997), couches the issue in terms of the trade-off 
between inclusion and exclusion errors: ‘Screening out the poorest is a bigger problem than 
including the non-poor in the targeting of any safety net transfer program; too much fine 
tuning in targeting may actually hurt the poor if the program loses political support.’ Baulch 
(2002: 22) puts this in context of a compromise. ‘A high level of inclusion/leakages to the 
non-poor may be necessary to secure sufficient political support for the anti-poverty 
intervention. As Pritchett (2005: 5) put it: “A leakier bucket may be better for redistribution of 
the poor”.’ 
 
Various forms of poverty targeting yield different political impacts. Lembani (2006: 25) argues 
that community-based mechanisms can ‘confer legitimacy on programmes that in turn may 
help to build political support for targeted approaches.’ Grosh and Leite (2009: 5) point out 
that social pensions generally garner more political support than do general social assistance 
programmes. Van der Berg, Siebrits and Lekezwa (2010: 13) cite South Africa’s social 
pension in making their point on political economy: ‘The political support for a grant targeted 
only at very poor people may be less than that of a grant reaching a larger group, as is the 
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case with the South African old age pension.’ Slater and Farrington (2009: 35) reinforce 
these points: ‘Whether means-tested or not, social pensions do enjoy strong and broad 
political support across different sectors of society.’ They also suggest that ‘self-targeting 
through public works programmes accompanied by targeting those who cannot work is 
frequently politically popular, in Africa, and elsewhere’ (ibid: 33). Elbers et al. (2004: 7) warns 
that very granular geographic targeting may be less politically popular than a more uniform 
scheme, which could lead to lower overall budgets for targeted transfers than would be the 
case under a more universal approach. Coady (2006: 14) highlights the issue of proxy 
means testing in Mexico in terms of it being ‘the source of heated political conflict’. Not all 
poverty targeting approaches yield the same political costs. 
 
Hodges et al. (2007) argue that the political costs of targeting severely undermined 
Mongolia’s Child Money Programme. The electorate perceived the exclusion of some 
children as unfair, creating pressure for a universal distribution of benefits which began in 
mid-2006. The more categorical approach politically entrenched the programme, and they 
reported a widespread consensus against a return to poverty targeting. The Child Money 
Programme ultimately succumbed to a combination of forces, including the global economic 
downturn which hit Mongolia’s mineral sector particularly hard. This experience highlights a 
potential trade-off between the political costs of targeting against the financial costs of 
universal provision. 
 
Pritchett (2005: 31) encapsulates the dilemma into a question of how well the social budget 
responds to a larger beneficiary constituency. ‘Electoral politics matter and doing the best for 
the poor requires taking a view on the “budget response function” – how will the support for 
the overall budget for transfers depend on the way in which it is targeted?’ Grosh and Leite 
(2009: 164) pose the question in terms of budget optimism versus pessimism, as depending 
on whether or not ‘the social unity resulting from a uniform provision of benefits will garner a 
sufficient budget (nationally financed in middle-income countries and donor assisted in low-
income countries) to provide meaningful protection.’ Alternatively, proponents of poverty 
targeting are pessimistic because of both political and technical obstacles to budgets 
becoming sufficient to provide meaningful universal benefits. Conway (pers. comm.) 
suggests that a politically optimal strategy might lie somewhere between narrow poverty 
targeting and universal programmes – including the ‘middle poor’, for instance, to build a 
political constituency. 
 
A second type of political cost results when beneficiary entitlements are not clear, leading to 
political manipulation of social priorities. This might be seen as a ‘micro-political’ set of costs. 
Sluchynsky (2009: 207) warns that ‘significant discretion with respect to eligibility rules or 
decisions… placed in the hands of local politicians… could lead to patronage to gain popular 
support at the cost of exclusion of some needy and eligible individuals.’ Pritchett (2005: 26) 
likewise warns that ‘providing too much discretion, and particularly discretion without 
conditions for adequate local oversight, can lead to abuses.’ 
 
Chinsinga (2005: 14) finds that ‘political patronage and capture of the interventions may lead 
to errors of inclusion’. Chinsinga (2005: 25) later argues: ‘The fact that communities 
consistently pointed out to the need for external agents in the management of the transfers 
so as to ensure fairness, transparency and accountability is quite striking. It particularly 
underlined the increasing levels of distrust in the traditional power structures even though 
their role remains central in the socio-political activities of the villages.’ 
 
Appropriate design and effective implementation can increase the political benefits (and 
minimise the political costs) of targeting approaches. De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006: 9) 
highlight the importance of simplicity and transparency to ensure political acceptability. More 
broadly targeted programmes are assumed to generate greater political support (Ellis, 2012). 
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As noted above, while this section summarises a wide range of assertions about political 
costs, their difficult-to-quantify nature means that rigorous evidence is hard to find, and 
credible conclusions about actual political impacts of different targeting mechanisms cannot 
be drawn. Although this is also true of other intangible (especially social and psycho-social) 
costs, political costs cannot be analysed in the same way that other types of costs are 
analysed. Randomised control trials face challenges to their external validity when trained on 
the central issues raised here, so definitive proof may prove elusive. Certainly, this topic will 
provide fertile ground for further research. 
4.7 Incentive-based costs 
Incentive costs may arise when beneficiaries change their behaviour in order to become 
eligible for the grant. Social pension eligibility criteria that exclude beneficiaries that receive 
investment income in excess of a specified threshold can create disincentives to save for 
one’s retirement, particularly if the targeting test is blunt. Income thresholds for household 
benefits may undermine incentives to work and increase household earnings. Ravallion 
(2007: 5) raises the ‘possibility that fine targeting will impose high marginal tax rates on 
recipients, possibly creating poverty traps.’ 
 
Programmes that target individual demographic characteristics that are not readily subject to 
behavioural manipulation (such as gender and age) pose the least risk of negative incentive 
costs. One cannot grow older faster in order to qualify for a pension, although the risk of age-
misreporting remains. Bobonis (2009: 24) finds that targeting women in Mexico’s 
Oportunidades programme led to ‘an increase in male partners’ use of threats or of 
emotional abuse with no associated physical or sexual abuse – among beneficiary 
households as a result of the program. These are consistent with the model’s predictions – 
an increase in women’s socioeconomic opportunities generate a greater incentive for male 
partners’ to use emotional violence or threats of physical violence to extract rents from the 
wife’s greater endowment and an associated reduction in the incidence of actual physical or 
sexual abuse.’ The negative incentive effects do not just affect the direct beneficiary but can 
influence the behaviour of related parties. 
 
Programmes that target outcome-type characteristics, however, are vulnerable to perverse 
behavioural responses. Jaspars and Maxwell (2008: 36), in their study of targeting 
malnourished children in complex food emergencies in Somalia, report a number of agencies 
concerned about families keeping ‘their children malnourished as an extreme coping strategy 
to access general food rations… [and] that families will share malnourished children to 
access general rations.’ 
 
Though individual demographic characteristics cannot easily be manipulated, benefits 
categorically targeted on household structure may create perverse incentives for 
household re-formation. For example, if programmes target ‘older persons without support’, 
families may encourage older relatives to live alone rather than in extended family structures 
with earners and carers (Grosh and Leite, 2009: 5). A programme that targets female-
headed households may undermine dual parent family structures, with greater costs in the 
long run to these households’ well-being. Kakwani and Subbarao (2005) expresses similar 
concerns, cautioning that targeting on household structure may be difficult in practice 
because household re-formation is so fluid. Slater and Farrington (2009: 39) point out that 
Argentina’s Jefes Y Jefas cash-for-work programme targeted households with dependents, 
leading to the ‘sharing’ of children across households. Ellis (2012) expresses similar 
concerns about households restructuring to meet eligibility criteria, but apart from the Slater 
and Farrington study no empirical evidence could be found for these speculative effects. 
 
Elbers et al. (2004: 8) warns that geographic targeting may induce inefficient and 
distortionary migration. Watkins (2008: 26) makes a similar point, pointing out that: ‘The 
40 
 
primary adverse incentives associated with geographic targeting are human migration from 
ineligible to eligible areas … if the cost of migrating is less than the transfer.’ The result will 
be otherwise unwarranted social dislocation. However neither study cites concrete evidence 
of this kind of distortion. 
 
Lembani (2006: 22-23) argues that community-based targeting will likely create greater 
incentive costs—in terms of potential and current beneficiaries deliberately reducing their 
labour supply and earning capacities in order to qualify to be included in the group of 
beneficiaries – because community officials directly determine eligibility based on their 
perceptions of household means. 
 
Perverse incentives may extend even to local and national authorities. Castañeda (2005: 21) 
points out that local authorities, being closely connected to the problem of poverty in their 
communities, yet not bearing direct fiscal responsibility for the centrally funded 
Oportunidades programme, have an ‘incentive to exaggerate the number of poor to get a 
greater amount of resources from central government. ... Abundant anecdotal evidence 
suggests that manipulation and or misuse of SISBEN may have in fact occurred, but 
unfortunately, there is no statistical evidence to quantify it and to determine the possible 
impact of such behavior.’ Another type of higher level perverse incentive has been identified 
by national analysts in the Sudan, concerned that targeted food aid programmes act as ‘a 
counter incentive for more proactive and appropriate government policies to address the 
livelihoods crisis in the region’ (Pantuliano 2006: 8). 
 
The impact of perverse incentives depends on the appropriate design and effective 
implementation of the programmes. Castañeda (2005) points out that poorly designed 
programmes can alter individual incentives. Pritchett (2005: 3) recommends ‘targeting on 
observable characteristics [to] avoid incentive problems that arise when transfers are 
conditioned on outcomes like income or employment.’ Ha, Chai and Alviar (2010: 6) 
speculate that proxy means tests, because they, focus on assets rather than income, should 
reduce the disincentive effect on work effort. Castañeda and Lindert (2005: 30), however, 
warn that: ‘Empirical studies in the US also suggest that asset tests may reduce savings by 
lower-income families.’ 
 
Alternatively, limiting the timeframe for benefits targeted on outcome-type characteristics 
may dampen perverse incentives. The World Food Programme in Somalia would discharge 
families with malnourished children from the programme after three months if the child was 
not ill, to minimize the risk of families starving their children to gain access to food rations 
(Jaspars and Maxwell 2008: 36). Another approach is to limit the size of the benefit, since 
larger ones intensify any perverse incentive effect (Stecklov et al. 2006: 27-28). 
 
While appropriate design and effective implementation can reduce incentive costs, only 
more universal approaches can eliminate them. Standing (2007: 29) argues that universal 
schemes are market neutral and do not create market distortions. Hodges et al. (2007: 37-
38) finds no clear evidence of negative incentive costs in Mongolia’s Child Money 
Programme, but reports that ‘some focus group participants suggested that it might reinforce 
a dependency “mindset”’ in its targeted phase, since participants might reduce their income 
to become eligible or maintain their eligibility. They point out that such a ‘dependency effect’ 
should not arise with a universal programme. However, relatively generous benefits could 
reduce work effort, whether targeted or universal, though there is no empirical evidence for 
this effect in social transfer programmes. 
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5 Cost-effectiveness of targeting 
An assessment of the cost-effectiveness of targeting must weigh the benefits of targeting 
against the full range of costs, many of which, along with benefits, can only be quantified with 
great difficulty. The assessment should be quantitative as far as possible. However, policy-
makers make necessary judgements whether or not credible quantitative evidence exists. 
Systematic qualitative evidence provides a useful foundation for these complex judgements – 
and may reflect the complexity of costing more effectively than necessarily arbitrary 
quantifications. 
 
The decision to target should reflect an analysis that selects a targeting approach that 
minimises the full cost of targeting for a particular level of quantified benefit (cost-
effectiveness analysis), or maximises the rate of return – benefits in relation to costs (cost-
benefit analysis). The benefits of poverty targeting can be assessed in one of two ways: (1) 
for a given level of benefits delivered to poor households, effective poverty targeting reduces 
the fiscal cost of the programme; or alternatively, (2) for a given allocation to a benefit 
programme, effective poverty targeting increases the potential benefits to be delivered to 
poor households. The costs include the full set of components discussed in the previous 
section. 
 
The challenge of assessing cost-effectiveness is constrained by data limitations and 
complexities that have hindered previous studies. The comprehensive literature review of 
Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2003) aimed to report targeting costs by programme, further 
classified by type of targeting methodology. However, of the 102 studies in their review, they 
identify 62 (61%) for which information on targeting costs is ‘not available’. Of the 40 studies 
for which they report references to targeting cost, only 8 (8%) include specific quantitative 
information on the direct costs of targeting. The other 32 only reported total administrative 
expenses, which include payments systems and other delivery costs. This study faces the 
same constraints. A similarly small fraction of our studies have explicit information on direct 
administrative costs of targeting, and only two quantified just one other component of 
targeting costs. 
 
The second constraint is the high degree of variability for each targeting methodology in the 
targeting performance. As mentioned in section 3.2 above, Coady et al.’s (2004: 2-3) study 
found that ‘80 percent of the variability in targeting performance was due to differences within 
targeting methods and only 20 percent was due to differences across methods’. While this 
review does not re-test this finding, qualitative analysis supports its ongoing applicability. 
This variability makes it impossible to draw strong conclusions from limited country studies or 
simulation analyses based primarily on design characteristics. 
 
With limited cost data and a relatively weak explanatory role for the choice of targeting 
approach on targeting effectiveness, rigorous cost-benefit analysis is not always possible. 
Over half the studies highlighted one or more elements of the costs of targeting, and a third 
referenced costs other than administrative expenses. However, cost-effectiveness analysis 
may be possible with incomplete quantitative data, in combination with a judgement on 
unquantified costs and benefits. Also, cost-effectiveness analysis can be done that includes 
assumptions on targeting error. 
 
Correlating the partial targeting cost estimates of Castañeda and Lindert (2005) summarised 
in the previous section with targeting errors provides some information about cost-
effectiveness. Their study reports the percentage of benefits received by the poorest quintile 
as an indicator of ‘targeting efficiency’. Given this, one measure of inclusion error is the 
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percentage of benefits received by beneficiaries not in this group.9 Figure 5.1 shows the 
correlation between interview costs and this measure of inclusion error for five Latin 
American programmes. (Castañeda and Lindert do not report the required targeting 
efficiency data for one of the programmes in their study.) The small sample does not permit 
significant inferences about the relationship, and in fact the correlation coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero. However, the coefficient has the expected negative sign, 
indicating that higher spending on targeting interviews is associated with lower inclusion 
error. 
 
Figure 5.1. Targeting costs and inclusion “error” in Latin American cash transfer 
programmes 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Castañeda and Lindert (2005: 50). 
 
A similar exercise provides some evidence on the relationship between exclusion error and 
targeting interview costs. Castañeda and Lindert (2005) report the percentage of the poorest 
quintile receiving benefits as an indicator of effective ‘coverage’. Given this, one measure of 
exclusion error is the percentage of the poorest quintile excluded from receiving.10 Figure 5.2 
shows the correlation between targeting interview costs and this measure of exclusion error 
for four Latin American programmes (Castañeda and Lindert do not report the required 
coverage data for two of the programmes in their study). 
 
The even smaller sample again precludes significant inferences about the relationship. 
However, it is surprising that the correlation coefficient is positive and close to one, indicating 
that higher spending on targeting interviews is associated with higher exclusion error. This 
may reflect the negative relationship between inclusion and exclusion errors. A hypothesis 
for more rigorous testing is whether or not higher spending on the targeting process in fact 
reduces inclusion error but also increases exclusion error, perhaps because of the increased 
private costs for the poor. This hypothesis is consistent with the limited empirical evidence 
and the review of qualitative studies. 
 
                                                 
9 This is not necessarily the most appropriate measure, since different programmes have varying objectives and eligibility 
criteria, so receipt of programme benefits by households in higher quintiles is not necessarily ‘error’. But this test provides 
an indication of how greater spending on the interview component of the targeting process is correlated with a greater 
concentration of benefits to the poorest quintile. 
10 The same type of caveat expressed in the previous footnote for inclusion error applies in the case of exclusion error, since 
different programmes have varying objectives and eligibility criteria. Given the fairly high coverage in these programmes, a 
‘lowest quintile’ threshold is a reasonable consistent level against which to assess exclusion. 
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Figure 5.2. Targeting costs and exclusion “error” in Latin American cash transfer 
programmes 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Castañeda and Lindert (2005: 43, 50). 
 
Watkins’ (2008) simulation of targeting outcomes, using Zambian data on population 
demographics, household expenditure, etc., provides a further opportunity to explore the 
relationship between targeting effectiveness and cost. Figure 5.3 below illustrates the 
positive correlation between targeting effectiveness (as measured by the intervention’s 
success in reducing the poverty gap) and a partial cost of targeting, which includes the direct 
financial cost of targeting to the government plus an estimate of opportunity costs for 
uncompensated officials and households. The costs exclude the social, psycho-social, 
political and incentive-based costs discussed above. Nonetheless, this represents the most 
comprehensive costing found among the studies included in this review. 
 
Figure 5.3 Targeting cost-effectiveness by methodology: simulations for Zambia 
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from Watkins (2008: 52). 
 
Watkins employs a random assignment targeting approach as a benchmark, and this 
demonstrates both the lowest cost and poorest impact. Means-testing with highly optimistic 
accuracy (85–90%) demonstrates both the highest cost and greatest impact. Geographic 
targeting is the lowest cost realistic methodology, and yields the second-best targeting 
performance. Two categorical targeting methodologies (households with people 60 years 
and older, and households with 7 or more members) indicate unusually high targeting costs 
because of assumptions about the specific implementation approaches adopted. Proxy 
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means testing is the next most expensive (after the means testing options), and yields the 
third best poverty gap reductions, but with optimistic assumptions about implementation 
errors. While the implications Watkins finds may not generalise easily to other countries 
because of the context-specific nature of the assumptions, his methodology shows promise 
for future research. 
 
This review demonstrates insufficient evidence in the literature on information required for 
optimal decisions about whether or not to target and the choice of targeting methodology. 
The majority of studies recognised that there are important costs to targeting, and many of 
them identified components across a spectrum of costs – not just administrative costs to 
government but also private costs to individuals and households, as well as social, psycho-
social, political and incentive-based costs. Given the data limitations, it is not possible to 
assert under what concrete circumstances poverty-targeting is appropriate, or specifically 
when one targeting methodology is better than another. Dutrey (2007: 8) encapsulates some 
of the key challenges. 
 
There is still no coherent or standardized method to measure the costs of targeting 
(including administrative, identification and transfer costs), leakage, exclusion and 
overall efficiency. The costs of targeting are sometimes only reported in terms of 
the cost of identification of the beneficiaries, although there is clear evidence that 
the continuous administration of a targeted system requires more administrative 
resources than a universal programme. 
 
Dutrey’s review identifies significant problems with the existing literature on the costs of 
targeting, including imprecise calculations of administrative costs and the lack of acceptable 
studies even for the basic approaches of estimating unit costs of delivering benefits to the 
poor. The problem Dutrey identifies for administrative expenses is even more pronounced for 
the other components of targeting costs. While several studies in this review provide limited 
information about administrative expenses, only two studies provide estimates for other 
components of targeting costs. Coady et al. (2004) concluded their systematic review of 
targeting with an appeal for better data. In fact, data on targeting performance has improved, 
and the results in the previous sections make use of this data. However, data supporting 
analysis of cost effectiveness have not improved sufficiently for this review to make concrete 
conclusions about what is one of the most important (and controversial) challenges in social 
policy: the decision-making about whether and how to target. This should be based on a 
rigorous analysis of the full spectrum of costs, as far as possible. 
 
While the lack of adequate quantitative data precludes a rigorous cost-benefit analysis for 
many programmes, DFID’s value-for-money framework conceptualises an approach to 
evaluating the cost-effectiveness of poverty targeting (DFID 2011; Miller and Samson 2012), 
that allows for more systematic analysis of social transfer programmes and better decision-
making on targeting choices, even with incomplete or unquantified information on targeting 
errors, costs and benefits. The diagram below illustrates the key linkages. Cost-effectiveness 
first requires the employment of the most economical inputs (for given outcomes), which 
implies adopting an appropriate targeting approach and taking account of non-targeting 
costs. The targeting cost might be measured as the average cost of identifying an eligible 
household. Cost efficiency requires minimising the cost of outputs. This may require attuning 
the design to achieve the appropriate trade-off between inclusion and exclusion errors while 
limiting targeting and other costs for the given output(s), recognising that some error is 
evitable with most programmes. One measure of efficiency is the money value of poverty 
gap reduction (the ‘output’) divided by the programme cost (the ‘input’) (Samson 2008; 
Samson et al. 2010; Samson 2011).11 Neither of these fully reflects the costs of excluding 
                                                 
11 However, this ‘poverty-reducing efficiency’ concept applies only if the aim of targeting is to reach poor households. If 
targeting aims for more categorical objectives, this efficiency measure may not be relevant. It is also arguable that poverty 
gap reduction is an outcome rather than an output. 
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poor households from the programme, which constitutes an important element of targeting 
performance and effectiveness. Reaching the targeted group with minimal exclusion error 
can strengthen programme outcomes and impact. Achieving programme outcomes for 
lowest cost represents cost-effectiveness—that is, value-for-money. 
 
Figure 5.4. Economy, efficiency and effectiveness in a value-for-money approach 
Input Process Output Outcome Impact
Economy Efficiency Effectiveness
Cost-effectiveness
 
 
Source: DFID (2011: 4). 
 
6 Conclusions and implications for policy 
This review has shed light on the errors, costs and secondary consequences of targeting in 
actual social transfer programmes in a comparative way across different targeting 
mechanisms. The knowledge summarised by this review should be useful for informing the 
future selection, design and implementation of targeting mechanisms for social transfer 
programmes. However, some cautionary observations must be made. 
 
First, while there are numerous studies reporting targeting errors and various costs, the 
range of targeting mechanisms reviewed means that once this analysis is performed by each 
targeting mechanism the evidence becomes less ‘robust’ and difficult to generalise. In terms 
of targeting errors, for instance, for community-based targeting we identified and reviewed 
only five documents, and only one document met our inclusion criteria for geographically-
targeted programmes, therefore we cannot draw strong conclusions based on these 
targeting mechanisms. Other targeting mechanisms were reviewed using more evidence. 
Nonetheless, it follows that it is extremely challenging to compare targeting outcomes across 
targeting mechanisms, from this limited evidence base. 
 
Second, we have not disaggregated this analysis by the range of types of social transfer 
programme included in the documents, because different interventions often have very 
different, non-comparable objectives. For instance, the extent to which we can compare the 
accuracy of targeting a social pension using categorical targeting with a conditional cash 
transfer programme that targets poor households depends on intended outcomes. If both 
interventions aim to reduce poverty, their targeting outcomes are comparable, but if the 
social pension simply aims to transfer resources to older persons while the conditional cash 
transfer aims to reduce poverty then we have a comparability problem. Similarly, the variety 
of conditions and contexts (geographic, political and programme-specific) under which the 
different social transfers are made could also affect the comparability of targeting errors and 
costs. 
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Earlier we summarised the key findings from the major targeting review conducted by Coady 
et al. (2004). This review asks different questions – we did not examine, for instance, 
whether targeted programmes deliver more resources to the poor than would random 
allocations – so our findings cannot be compared against those of Coady et al. We do 
endorse the conclusion that no single targeting mechanism works best in all contexts – the 
key factor is aligning the mechanism to programme objectives. We also agree with the 
Coady et al. finding that implementation is the single most important determinant of targeting 
success – this is evident from the range of outcomes in terms of targeting errors within a 
single mechanism. No targeting mechanism generates uniformly low or uniformly high 
inclusion and/or exclusion errors. 
 
We believe this review is the first to synthesise evidence on the full range of targeting costs. 
6.1 Implications for practice and research 
6.1.1 Targeting errors 
This review has identified several implications for social transfer practitioners and 
researchers. A fundamental conclusion is that, although most social transfers are intended to 
reduce poverty and vulnerability, it is unrealistic to expect any intervention to reach all poor 
people and exclude all non-poor people – perfect targeting is possible in theory but 
effectively impossible in reality. Firstly, some categorically targeted programmes reach 
discrete subgroups who are supported because they are socially vulnerable, not (only) 
because they are poor. In these cases, some inclusion and exclusion errors should be 
expected. But programme designers should carefully consider whether the scale of inclusion 
and exclusion errors (in terms of poverty) is justified, or whether alternative instruments 
should be considered that reduce these errors. Secondly, very few interventions attempt to 
reach all poor people – they display ‘undercoverage by design’ rather than ‘exclusion error in 
implementation’ – so a holistic assessment should aggregate errors across all components of 
a social protection system, rather than attributing a high ‘exclusion error’ to each component. 
 
The main implication that can be drawn in comparing targeting mechanisms is that the 
effectiveness of each individual mechanism depends on the context, so the selection of an 
appropriate targeting mechanism should follow an assessment of the local context. 
 
 Means tested programmes generally perform disappointingly in developing countries, 
reporting relatively high inclusion and exclusion errors in terms of reaching the poor, 
despite attempting to assess individual poverty status. 
 Proxy means tests are highly sensitive to the proxies selected – the correlation with 
household income or consumption varies by indicator, so performance varies widely 
across programmes. 
 Categorical targeting often achieves low inclusion and exclusion errors in terms of the 
eligibility criteria, but higher errors in terms of reaching the poor and screening out the 
non-poor, because the individual’s poverty status is not directly assessed by the 
targeting mechanism. 
 Geographically targeted programmes are sensitive to the spatial distribution of poverty, 
performing best where poverty is concentrated in discrete bounded areas, so geographic 
targeting might be best suited as the first stage of a multi-stage targeting process. 
 Community-based targeting, either ‘delegated’ or ‘devolved’, requires specific 
conditions to be effective (e.g. social cohesion, no domination by elites) but can keep 
inclusion and exclusion errors in implementation relatively low, mainly because of local 
knowledge and intensive engagement in the targeting process. 
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 Self-targeting requires lowering benefits and/or raising access costs to deter the non-
poor, but this is difficult to manipulate in contexts of high poverty – on public works 
programmes, exclusion errors are typically very high because of not enough 
employment opportunities, and job rationing has to be applied. 
6.1.2 Targeting costs 
This review examines evidence on the full range of costs associated with targeting, both to 
the programme and to beneficiaries or participants. Most of these costs are substantially 
under-researched. The trade-off between accuracy and (administrative) cost is confirmed by 
this review, but resolving this trade-off is ultimately a policy choice rather than a technical 
calculation. 
 
 Administrative costs of targeting tend to increase as accuracy increases, and are by 
their nature higher for individual assessment methods (e.g. means testing), but lower for 
‘blanket coverage’ (geographic) and ‘universal’ (i.e. categorical) approaches – but 
overall, administrative costs of targeting are not very high. 
 Private costs to applicants – including transport, documentation, queuing time and 
opportunity costs of applying for social transfers – can be prohibitively high and 
inadvertently exclude eligible poor individuals, or they can be set high deliberately, as a 
self-targeting device. 
 Social costs include the divisions within communities between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries, which can undermine social capital and cohesion – although these costs 
are often substantial, they are rarely investigated, but they do not appear to vary much 
by targeting mechanism. 
 Psycho-social costs such as stigmatisation might be less significant than is often 
thought, and in some cases not being included in a social transfer programme is 
considered more stigmatising than being officially recognised as ‘poor’ – in fact, 
beneficiaries are sometimes positively empowered by their inclusion. 
 Political costs of targeting can be significant, given the evidence that universal 
programmes generate broader political support than narrowly targeted social transfers 
for the poor; it is also important to avoid political manipulation of the targeting process, 
either to buy political support or to capture resource transfers. 
 Incentive costs describe behavioural changes by applicants – e.g. in work effort or job-
search, household composition, migration or fertility choices – and these (dis)incentives 
vary by targeting mechanism because different eligibility criteria invite different 
behavioural adjustments in order to qualify for benefits. 
 
6.1.3 Cost-effectiveness 
Quantifying the cost-effectiveness of alternative targeting mechanisms is complicated by the 
fact that many costs associated with targeting are ‘qualitative’ rather than ‘quantitative’ (e.g. 
psycho-social, political, and incentive costs). Most empirical evidence on targeting cost-
effectiveness limits the analysis to administrative costs. Analysis of the full spectrum of 
targeting costs is urgently needed for a more holistic understanding of the relative cost-
effectiveness of alternative targeting mechanisms. 
 
Comparative evidence across several Latin American programmes finds that higher interview 
costs are associated with lower inclusion error (investing more in targeting reduces the 
selection of ineligible beneficiaries) but higher exclusion error (rigorous targeting tends to 
exclude more eligible people, perhaps because the private costs of applying are higher). 
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Simulated cost data from Zambia (which might not be generalisable) confirms that means 
testing is the most expensive but (potentially) most accurate targeting mechanism, while 
geographic and categorical targeting are relatively inexpensive but are assumed to be 
relatively inaccurate. As with many decisions in the targeting process, a trade-off seems to 
be inevitable. Whether policy-makers have a bias towards (1) minimising ‘leakages’ to the 
ineligible or (2) ensuring that all ‘needy’ or eligible individuals are reached by a social transfer 
programme is a political judgement, not a calculation that can be solved by a technical 
formula. 
6.2 Conclusion 
This report has demonstrated that targeting social transfers is associated with various errors 
(inclusion and exclusion, by design and in implementation), costs (administrative and other), 
and secondary consequences (both positive and negative, some of which, such as incentive 
distortions, can be modelled as costs of targeting). Our hypothesis, as stated at the start of 
this literature review, was that ‘different targeting mechanisms are associated with systematic 
differences in terms of inclusion and exclusion errors, financial costs and secondary 
consequences’. 
 
An ‘ideal’ outcome would be to identify the most efficient and cost-effective targeting 
mechanisms – or perhaps to rank them – to provide an unambiguous answer to the policy-
maker’s question: ‘What is the ‘best’ mechanism for targeting social transfers to 
achieve the programme’s objectives?’ Having reached the end of this review of recent 
evidence, we conclude that no optimal mechanism exists. The choice of targeting 
mechanism is highly context-specific and depends on (1) the objectives of each social 
transfer programme, (2) how well the targeting strategy is designed and implemented. This 
conclusion resonates with that reached by Coady et al. (2004), who identified wider variation 
in targeting performance between programmes within each targeting mechanism than across 
targeting mechanisms. 
 
This conclusion makes it difficult, if not impossible, to derive generalisable principles for 
comparative effectiveness across targeting mechanisms. Nonetheless, the evidence does 
suggest the following lessons for better more informed selection and better design and 
implementation of targeting mechanisms: 
 
 Targeting errors: means testing is often relatively expensive and inaccurate; proxy 
means tests and categorical targeting give variable results depending on which proxies 
or categories are selected; geographical targeting performs best if poverty is 
concentrated in bounded areas; community-based targeting requires careful design and 
intensive supervision to avoid elite capture; self-targeting by raising access costs or 
lowering benefits can compromise the programme objectives. 
 Targeting costs: there appears to be an unavoidable trade-off between targeting 
accuracy and targeting cost, but it is important to consider the full range of costs, not 
only administrative expenditure – but also private costs to applicants such as transport, 
social costs such as effects of targeting on social cohesion, incentive costs involving 
behavioural changes by applicants, psycho-social costs such as stigmatisation of 
beneficiaries, and political costs such as politicisation – but note also that some of these 
secondary effects can be positive rather than negative.
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Appendix 1 Tables for targeting errors 
 
Table A1.1. Targeting errors on means tested programmes 
No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
#3 
Social cash transfer 
(Ndihme Ekonomika) 
Urban families with no other income 51.1%  
Proxy 1: Percentage of poorest 10 
percent not receiving assistance 
  [Albania] 
Rural households with small 
landholdings 
62.6%  
Proxy 2: Percentage of poorest 20 
percent not receiving assistance 
   70.8%  
Proxy 3: Percentage of poorest 40 
percent not receiving assistance 
    6.2% 
Proxy 4: Percentage of richest 60 
percent receiving assistance 
    10.1% 
Proxy 5: Percentage of richest 80 
percent receiving assistance 
    11.9% 
Proxy 6: Percentage of richest 90 
percent receiving assistance 
#4 
Minimum Livelihood Guarantee 
Scheme, known as Di Bao 
(DB). 
Poor urban households 71%  
(Undercoverage rather than errors in 
income assessment) 
  [China] 
(means tested income below a 
specified poverty line) 
 40% 
Recipients with incomes above the 
income threshold for eligibility 
#42 
Unified Monthly Benefit 
[Kyrgyz Republic] 
Household cash income + imputed 
farm income per capita < GMLC 
(guaranteed minimal level of 
consumption) 
69% 35% 
“the program fails to protect 69% of the 
individuals in the poorest quintile. At 
the same time, more than half of the 
beneficiaries are leaked to 
households from richer quintiles” 
[p33] 
#45 
Children Benefits 
[Azerbaijan] 
“a categorical test to determine how 
many children are in an applicant's 
family and an income-test to 
determine the salary of the applicant. 
[If] the family's income per capita for 
88.5% 86.3% 
“Children Benefits is the only income-
tested social assistance program in 
Azerbaijan and the only program with 
an explicit poverty-reduction mandate. 
The Children Benefits provides cash 
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No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
the previous quarter is less that the 
eligibility level of 16,500 AZM, the 
applicant is eligible for the benefit.” 
[p3] 
income for families with children 
assumed to be poor.” [p3] 
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Table A1.2. Targeting errors on proxy means test programmes 
No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
#19 
Conditional cash transfers 
[Brazil, Ecuador] 
“we define the target population as the 
poorest 20 percent of households” 
[p.76] 
45%  
Brazil: “Among those who are eligible 
by income, enrolment is shown at just 
55 percent” [p77] 
   33%  
Ecuador: “only 67 percent of the poor 
end up receiving benefits” [p76] 
#35 
#64 
Social welfare programmes 
[Colombia] 
1) housing quality and possession of 
durables; 2) public utility services; 3) 
human capital (education) levels; 4) 
family demographics, unemployment, 
dependency ratio and income per 
capita 
19% 31% 
SISBEN proxy means test database is 
compared against the national 
income distribution: 81% of poor are 
correctly identified, 69% of those 
classified as poor are poor. 
#44 
Food subsidy 
[Egypt] 
Modelling a proxy means test, based 
on location, household composition, 
social categories, housing quality, 
ownership of assets and consumer 
durables, employment and verifiable 
income-related variables 
28% 16% 
“nearly three-quarters of those defined 
as poor using actual expenditure 
were also predicted as being poor by 
the model, giving an error of 
exclusion of 28%” 
“16% of the actual non-poor were 
predicted as poor, representing the 
error of inclusion” [p35] 
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No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
#46 
Child Money Programme 
(conditional cash transfer) 
[Mongolia] 
 
Proxy means test (ex ante) 
(predicted exclusion and 
inclusion errors in design 
based on the PMT formula) 
11 indicators:  
location,  
household size,  
household head’s level of education,  
household members’ employment, 
housing conditions,  
household assets,  
number of livestock owned,  
means of transport owned,  
support and assistance received,  
the presence of household members 
with physical disabilities, elderly 
members (aged 70+), full orphans, 
and single mothers or fathers with 
four or more children. [p10] 
42% 38% 
“even without taking into account the 
CMP’s implementation problems, the 
targeted CMP had a high ex ante 
inclusion error due to the properties of 
the formula used in the proxy means 
test. Analysis of the formula … 
reveals that 38% of the beneficiary 
households could be expected to be 
non-poor” [p14] 
 
Proxy means test (ex post) 
(actual exclusion and inclusion 
errors in implementation) 
20.7% 56.9% 
“actual performance revealed a much 
higher inclusion error than the 38% 
expected from ex ante simulation, 
which means that the targeted 
programme suffered not only from 
technical problems concerning the 
formula used for proxy means testing 
but also from serious shortcomings in 
implementation. … 56.9% of 
beneficiary households and 51.3% of 
beneficiary children were ‘non-poor’, 
i.e. living above the Minimum 
Subsistence Level.” 
 “Universal” (categorical) 
In 2006, “the parliament adopted a new 
law which made the provision of ‘child 
money’ a universal entitlement, to 
which all children under 18 years of 
age would be eligible” [p11] 
8% 65% 
The ‘universal’ child benefit programme 
still has some exclusion errors 
because 8% of “households below 
the MSL do not have children and 
therefore are automatically excluded. 
… some children were still not 
reached by the ‘universal’ 
programme, either because of self-
exclusion by wealthier families or 
because of barriers to access [e.g. 
“lack of documents”] by extremely 
vulnerable and marginalized poor 
families and by children living outside 
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No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
a family framework [e.g. street 
children].” [p15] 
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Table A1.3. Targeting errors on categorically targeted programmes 
No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
#15 Social pension Age (“universal” old age pension) 23%  Nepal 
  [several countries]  13%  Brunei 
  (Exclusion error measured only by 7%  Namibia 
   age eligibility, not poverty status) 6%  Mexico City 
   (secondary sources cited) 4%  Botswana 
   0%  Bolivia 
   0%  Mauritius 
   0%  Samoa 
#36 
Social pension  
(Old Age Allowance) 
[Bangladesh] 
Age (over 60 years) 
 
(Inclusion error measured by age 
eligibility) 
 24% 
“24% of households receiving the old 
age allowance did not have a 
household member aged 60 or 
above” [para.47] 
#45 
Social pension 
[Azerbaijan] 
Age 
 
(Errors measured by poverty status, not 
age eligibility) 
95.2% 86.1% 
“Social Pensions provide protection for 
the elderly who do not qualify for a 
social insurance pension bec-ause of 
the lack of contribution to the Pay-As-
You-Go scheme.” [p3] 
#45 
Disability grant 
[Azerbaijan] 
“households with disabled members 
during the Karabakh conflict with 
Armenia” [p3] 
99.8% 47.7% Karabakh benefits 
#45 
Disability grant 
[Azerbaijan] 
“households with disabled members … 
from the Chernobyl nuclear accident 
in Ukraine in 1986.” [p3] 
100.0% 100.0% Chernobyl benefits 
#45 
Disability grant 
[Azerbaijan] 
“households with disabled children” [p3] 100.0% 83.5% Child Disability 
#45 
Student grants 
[Azerbaijan] 
“full-time students” [p3] 97.9% 91.1% Scholarships 
#45 
Grants for war veterans, 
decorated civilians, military 
and government personnel 
[Azerbaijan] 
 war and labour veterans 
 citizens decorated with orders and 
medals 
 personnel of civil, security and 
military services 
94.9% 90.1% 
“Other Benefits [includes] merit-based 
privileges for war and labor veterans, 
and citizens decorated with orders 
and medals. Another category is 
occupa-tional benefits for personnel 
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No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
 personnel of some other 
government organizations 
of civil, security and military services, 
and some other government 
organizations” [p3] 
#40 Social assistance programmes “Categorical benefits such as child  94% 36% Poland 
  (child allowances, subsidies allowances, and subsidies on public  57% 86% Hungary 
  on public services) services for the aging or for public  90% 92% Bulgaria 
  [Eastern Europe] workers and their dependents” 87% 84% Russian Federation 
  [p19] 90% 65% Estonia 
#22 
Cash and food transfer 
programmes 
(1) Female-headed household  78% 
Food Security Vulnerable Group 
Development (FSVGD) 
  [Bangladesh]   70% 
Income-Generating Vulnerable Group 
Development (IGVGD) 
    64% Food for Asset Creation (FFA) 
 (many eligibility criteria)   21% Rural Maintenance Program (RMP) 
 (Inclusion error if “beneficiaries (2) Age range (18–49 years)  11% FSVGD 
 failed to meet this criterion but   11% IGVGD 
 were selected for the programs”   6% FFA 
 [p81])   3% RMP 
  (3) Illiteracy  9% RMP (only a criterion on RMP) 
#59 
Livelihood Empowerment 
Against Poverty (LEAP) 
[Ghana] 
“people over 65 in ultra-poor 
households, households containing 
orphans and vulnerable children, and 
persons with severe disabilities” [p4] 
35.9%  Rural exclusion error 
  (analysis of GLSS data)  73.4% Urban inclusion error 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
Table A1.4. Targeting errors on geographically targeted programmes 
No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
#27 
Social assistance programmes 
[Vietnam] 
“poor and remote communes” 80.5% 7.7% 
“the vast majority of poor people in 
Vietnam do not live in an officially 
designated poor or remote commune” 
[p36] 
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Table A1.5. Targeting errors on community-based targeting programmes 
No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
#2 Social cash transfer Ultra-poor + labour-constrained 5.6%  
Proxy 1: Households that take only one 
meal per day 
  [Malawi] (3 proxies of ultra-poverty tested) 9.4%  
Proxy 2: Households in the lowest 20% 
expenditure category 
   10.3%  
Proxy 3: Households below the food 
poverty line 
 
(Delegated CBT: based on 
administratively-defined 
eligibility criteria) 
Labour-constrained: dependency 
ratio>3 or no working aged adult, or 
working aged adult has chronic illness 
or disability 
 24% 
Household is receiving transfers but is 
not labour-constrained 
#12 
‘Glass of Milk’ subsidy 
programme 
Poor children (44% of households with 
children aged 3-11) 
51.4% 16.8% 
Targeting based on poverty among all 
households 
  [Peru] 
Households with pregnant/ lactating 
women 
38.2% 27.0% 
Targeting based on poverty among 
households with children aged <7 
 (Delegated CBT) People with tuberculosis (TB) 36.5% 39.6% Targeting based on child malnutrition 
#50 
General food distribution 
[Tanzania, Zimbabwe] 
<=3 acres (=poorest) or >3 acres of 
“unproductive” land (=poor); 
<=2 cattle; zero or low-income-
generating activities [p54] 
 5–12% Tanzania 
 (Delegated CBT) 
Land<=2-3 hectares; <=2-3 cattle; no 
permanent salaried employment [p61] 
 10–13% Zimbabwe 
#51 
Agricultural Input Subsidy 
Programme 
[Malawi] 
 
(Devolved CBT) 
Communities identified vulnerable 
members; criteria included: 
being elderly, weak and vulnerable; 
orphans, widows + female-headed 
households keeping orphans; 
“households with multiple problems”; 
disabled, chronically ill household 
head or keeping sick people 
67% 5% 
“95% of the targeted households for 
agricultural inputs were poor” and 
food insecure. [p84] 
“67% food insecure households … 
were excluded. Ideally these 
households should have been 
included because they satisfy the 
selection criteria. However, due to 
limited quota only 33% of the 
deserving households were targeted.” 
[p84] 
#94 
Vision 2020 Umurenge 
Programme 
Bottom 2 “social poverty” ‘Ubudehe’ 
categories  
60.0% 21.1% 
“Social poverty” assessed against 
“extreme income poverty” and 
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No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
[Rwanda] 
 
(Devolved CBT) 
+ Land constrained <=0.25ha 
+ Adult labour in the household  
(0 = Direct Support; 1+ = Public Works) 
“human income poverty” lines 
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Table A1.6. Targeting errors on self-targeted programmes 
No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
#96 
Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP) –  
Public Works component 
[Ethiopia] 
Food insecure rural households:  
3+ months of food shortage in the 
previous year 
69.9% 12.5% 
“88% of beneficiaries and 70% of non-
beneficiaries reported experiencing 
three or more months of food 
shortage in the preceding year” [p23] 
 
Table A1.7. Targeting errors on programmes using multiple targeting mechanisms 
No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
#5 Social cash transfer 
Means test: Household income below 
poverty line 
21.6%  
(Eligible households did not apply for 
programme benefits) 
 
National Social Emergency 
Plan 
[Uruguay] 
+ Proxy means test: “Critical needs 
index” based on household 
characteristics 
   
#11 Disability Grant Means test: Income and assets 38%–46% 34% Income + disability tests together 
  [South Africa] 
+ Categorical: “Disability test”: inability 
to work 
49% 17% Disability test alone 
#14 
Conditional cash transfer 
 
Red de Proteccion Social 
[Nicaragua] 
Geographic: Localities with high 
marginality index scores in 
municipalities with good institutional 
capacity and schools, in extremely 
poor departments 
3%–10%  
(Low levels of undercoverage in 
programme areas) 
  
+ Proxy means test: Household assets, 
land, economic resources, business 
enterprises 
 6%–15% 
(Low levels of leakage in programme 
areas) 
#20 
Conditional cash transfer 
 
Red de Proteccion Social 
[Nicaragua] 
Geographic: Poor districts (all 
households in poorest districts) 
3% 14% Poor households 
 
(2 targeting methods applied in 
different areas) 
Proxy means test: Poor households in 
less poor districts) 
3% 
10% 
17% 
6% 
Extremely poor households 
Poor households 
#38 
Food-for-School Programme 
(FSP) 
Geographic: (1) poorest provinces; (2) 
poorer municipalities within each of 
80% 62% Primary schools 
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No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
[Philippines] the poorest provinces 
  
+ Institutional: public schools and day-
care centres 
75% 59% Day-care centres 
  
+ Categorical: “households in selected 
geographic areas who have children 
who are pre-school or Grade 1 pupils 
in public elementary schools or 
children who attend day-care centers” 
[p5] 
   
#43 
Social cash transfer 
(Ndihme Ekonomika) 
 [Albania] 
Categorical: Ineligible if: (1) at least one 
household member owns capital 
assets with the exception of the living 
house; (2) at least one household 
member is employed or self-
employed; (3) at least one household 
member is living abroad for any 
reason except for studying or medical 
treatment; (4) at least one household 
member in working age is not 
registered at labor offices as 
unemployed; (5) at least one house-
hold member takes ‘deliberate 
actions’ aiming to get NE benefits if 
not eligible; 6) the household has 
refused ownership of agricultural land 
offered by the government. [p4] 
67% 64% 
Undercoverage = “Percentage of poor 
households not covered by the 
program” [p13] 
 
Leakage = “Percentage of non-poor 
among the beneficiary households” 
[p13] 
  
Means test: The income threshold is 
equal to the unemployment benefit 
per adult equivalent where the 
equivalence scales are the weights 
attributed to the different type of 
household members. [p4] 
   
#48 
Social cash transfer 
 
Cash Transfer programme for 
Orphans and Vulnerable 
Categorical:  
Households containing at least one 
orphan or other vulnerable child. An 
OVC is a child (<18) who is: 
 2% 
“Overall the programme was successful 
in reaching its target population (OVC 
households), with only 2% of 
beneficiary households found to 
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No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
Children (CT-OVC) 
[Kenya] 
• an orphan (single or double); or 
• chronically ill; or 
• looked after by chronically ill carer. 
contain no OVCs and 21% of OVC 
households being supported by the 
programme in the programme areas 
covered by the evaluation.” [p23] 
  
+Proxy means test: 
Household meets at least 8 of 17 
poverty characteristics: (1) No adult 
reached standard 8; (2) Caregiver is 
not working or is a farmer or labourer; 
(3) Caregiver has <2 acres of land; 
(4) Walls are mud/ cow-dung or 
grass/sticks; (5) Floor is mud or cow-
dung; (6) Roof is mud or cow-dung; 
(7) No toilet or pan/ bucket; (8) 
Drinking water is river, lake or pond; 
(9) Lighting fuel is firewood; (10) 
Cooking fuel is firewood or residue/ 
animal waste/ grass; (11) Owns no 
real estate property; (12) Owns 2 or 
less zebu cattle; (13) Owns no hybrid 
cattle; (14) Owns 5 or less goats; (15) 
Owns 5 or less sheep; (16) Owns no 
pigs; (17) Owns no camels. [p22] 
78% 2% 
“The basis on which these poverty 
characteristics were chosen is not 
clear, and the analysis presented 
below demonstrates that they do not 
perform well in identifying the poorest 
households (in fact 95% of OVC 
households in treatment locations are 
defined as poor according to these 
criteria).” [p23] 
 
“”exclusion errors in implementation 
were inevitable because, due to 
budget limitations, only 21% of OVC 
households and 22% of eligible OVC 
households could be supported, and 
should therefore not be interpreted as 
a failure of the programme’s 
implementation systems as they 
would be for a universal rights-based 
programme.” [p26] 
#61 
Conditional cash transfer 
 
PROGRESA 
[Mexico] 
Geographic (communities) 
+ Means test (households) 
“First, communities are selected using 
a marginality index based on census 
data. Second, within the selected 
communities, households are chosen 
using survey data collected at the 
household level.” [p1771] 
6.6%  
“approximately seven out of 100 
households classified as extreme 
poor by the ‘perfect’ targeting method 
based on consumption are not 
classified as poor by PROGRESA” 
[p1775] 
   70.1% 
“when the low poverty line is applied 
the leakage rate is high by 
construction” [p1775] 
#72 
Old Age Allowance 
[Bangladesh] 
Categorical (older persons) 
+ CBT (delegated) 
A committee of local elites identifies 
 60.4% 
“community selection does a good job 
in distinguishing between poor and 
non-poor older persons but it is much 
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No. Programme + Country Eligibility criteria 
Exclusion 
error 
Inclusion 
error 
Indicator/ (Comment) 
poor older persons  less accurate in selecting the poorest 
among the poor” [p77] 
#97 
Social cash transfer 
 
Cash Transfer programme for 
Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children (CT-OVC) 
[Kenya] 
Target group: Ultra-poor house-holds 
with orphans or vulnerable children 
(1) Geographic: Districts by poverty + 
HIV rates 
(2) Community-based (delegated): 
Committees identify beneficiaries by 
eligibility criteria 
(3) Proxy means test: PMT + ranking = 
quota 
 22% 
“total household poverty is … 78 
percent among CT-OVC program 
recipients” [p6] 
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